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In recent decades, political parties espousing extreme nationalist, xenophobic, and even
outright racist platforms have enjoyed variable success in national elections across Europe.
While a vibrant research literature has sought to better understand the sources of support for
such parties, remarkably little attention has been paid to the interplay between parties and the
broader social networks of extremism in which they are embedded. To remedy this deficiency,
the present study examines the relations between far-right parliamentary parties and their
extra-parliamentary networks. One level of analysis tests whether there is a relationship
between a party’s position within a network and its sustainability. Social network analysis is
employed to assess the nature and structure of ties between Belgian organizations online. In

addition, systematic textual analysis of website content is used to determine how a party’s
ideological position within the network impacts its sustainability. The second level of analysis
is a qualitative study based on in-depth interviews with members of Flemish nationalist
organization in order to better understand how actors experience social networks. Evidence
suggests that the most sustainable parties are those that have dense connections with other
nationalist organizations. Mapping relations between far-right parties that compete openly
within the rules of institutionalized democracy and their wider social networks can provide
important policy-relevant insight into contemporary challenges posed by illiberal forces.
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1
1.1

INTRODUCTION

The Importance of Understanding Far-Right Networks

Over the past 30 years, far-right parties with extreme nationalist, xenophobic, or racist platforms
have become well established across Europe. These parties are part of a larger mobilization of farright movements and have formal and informal ties to paramilitary movements or neo-Nazi gangs
that have been implicated in violent attacks against immigrants. In 2012 and 2013, members of the
Greek far-right party Golden Dawn were accused of carrying out acts of violence against immigrants.
Similarly, the 2011 massacre in Norway by a member of right-wing extremist Progress Party, Anders
Breivik, highlights the threat far-right extremism can pose to safety and security. In the aftermath of
terrorist attacks in Paris and the 2016 Brussels bombings, the anti-immigrant Vlaams Belang
(Flemish Interest, VB) and the far-right paramilitary organization Voorpost (Outpost, VP) have
surged in popularity. These groups and the policies they advocate for antagonize and alienate
Muslim immigrant communities, creating the potential for further Islamic radicalization and threats
to Belgium’s national security. In the polls and on the streets, far-right parties and extremist
movements have the ability to impact the quality of democracy, the civil rights of immigrant
communities, and public safety. In order to effectively counter extremism, it is important to
understand the structure of extremist networks.

1.2

The Purpose of this Study

Political observers and watchdog groups express concern that the growing acceptance of extreme
nationalistic and xenophobic rhetoric and policies poses a genuine threat to the quality of
democracy in Europe. While a vibrant research literature has sought to better understand the
sources of support for such parties (especially those on the far-right), remarkably little attention
has been paid to the interplay between parties and the broader social networks of extremism in
which they are embedded. To remedy this deficiency, the present study will identify structural
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and ideological patterns in far-right networks and determine how these patterns influence the
sustainability of far-right parties. The study is guided by the following central research question:
How does the structure of far-right networks influence the trajectory of far-right parties? The
central hypothesis is that parties that occupy a central position within their broader networks are
more sustainable than those that are on the fringe.
There is a tendency to focus only on far-right parties and to ignore the variety of nonparty actors in the far-right family. Far-right parties are embedded in broader networks of
extremism and they have relationships with non-party actors (e.g. paramilitary organizations,
student movements) that can strengthen or undermine their likelihood of success. This study
uses social network analysis to examine how relationships between organizations on the far-right
influence nationalist mobilization and party sustainability. The study involves two levels of
analysis. The first is an analysis of the structure of far-right online networks in Belgium, France,
and the United Kingdom. These countries have more than one far-right party competing within
the same far-right network. A web crawler will collect data on the links between sites and create
digital maps of the organizational structure of the networks.1 These maps will reveal general
patterns of cooperation and contestation amongst organizations on the far-right and illuminate
the ways in which a party’s centrality within the network shapes its performance.
A second level of analysis will provide an in-depth ethnography of the far-right networks
in Belgium. The goal is to provide a structured comparison of Belgium’s far-right parties, which
vary on the degree of far-right party integration within the larger radical network. Through
archival research, participant observations, and field interviews, I will collect data on the density
1

The web crawler used was VOSON, which is part of the Virtual Observatory for the Study of Online Networks or
VOSON system. This system strives to recreate the typical user experience, collects data on linkages between
websites, and incorporates tools to conduct social network analysis and textual analysis. For more information
about the VOSON system, see Ackland (2010).
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of ties between parties and extremist organizations. The semi-structured interviews with farright party representatives, members of extremist organizations, and members of nationalist
organizations permit an examination of the causal mechanisms behind the theoretical
assumptions about the relationship between structure and the capacity of the far-right to achieve
its goals. In addition, the interviews provide an opportunity to understand how individuals
experience and perceive the social networks in which they are embedded. Mapping relations
between rejectionist parties that compete openly within the rules of institutionalized democracy
and their wider social networks can provide important policy-relevant insight into contemporary
challenges posed by illiberal forces.
1.3

Expected Results

\I expect to find that parties that occupy a central position within the network will have an
advantage over parties that are on the fringe. Parties at the center of the broader far-right
network should have more network power, giving them a greater ability to diffuse their policy
platforms and mobilize their support base. While some suggest (Spanje and Van der Brug 2007,
Hellström et al. 2012) that successful far-right parties have a tendency to moderate and cut ties
with more extreme organizations in an effort to attain or keep their positions; I anticipate that
successful far-right parties will continue to maintain their ties with extremist organizations-if not
publicly, then covertly. Even when parties deny that their ties with extremist organizations in
public forums, I expect that the online and offline analysis of network structures will confirm
that the ties exist. A party could publicly disassociate itself from an extremist organization, yet
this organization may continue to link to the party’s websites or send members to party rallies.
This support could prove beneficial to a far-right party even if it does not desire it. Overall, the
tendency to believe that links with extremist organizations will delegitimize the far-right in the
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public’s eye is based in the optimistic premise that the majority of the public will not tolerate
illiberalism. However, as Mudde notes, the tendency to treat the far-right as pathological is
really an unwillingness to admit that there are large swaths of society, even in liberal
democracies, that hold xenophobic or racist sentiments. Overall, I anticipate that far-right parties
that occupy a central position within the broader far-right network will prove to be more
sustainable than parties that do not. In addition, I anticipate that parties that occupy an
ideologically central position within the broader far-right network will be more sustainable than
parties that are on the ideological fringe. For example, if the broader far-right network is
predominantly xenophobic, but not explicitly Islamophobic, I anticipate that a xenophobic party
will prove to be most sustainable.
Far-right scholars often talk about the threat posed to the far-right by the moderate right
(Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009); however, I anticipate that a potential competitor could emerge
from within the far-right family. In some countries such as Britain, France, and Belgium, there
are several far-right parties operating with the same far-right network. If two parties occupy a
similar structural and ideological position within the network, these parties could be competitors
and not allies. I anticipate that, in this situation, the most successful party will be the one with
the densest ties with other organizations in the network. However, I believe a party can also
become vulnerable to a niche competitor from with the network. I expect that the competitive
effect of one far right party over another will increase as the asymmetry in their overlapping
memberships increases.
1.4

Impact of Research

While apocalyptic accounts of the impact of the far-right have been overstated, it has undeniably
altered the political landscape in Europe. As Art notes:
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It is undeniable that the far-right is profoundly influencing how European states and societies negotiate the
issues that immigration has introduced. Even when they have not been in power, radical right parties have
shown a startling ability to set the agenda on issues such as asylum, immigration quotas, integration
requirement and citizenship laws (Art 2011: 9).

Within the past five years the far-right has enjoyed unprecedented electoral success in Sweden,
the Netherlands, Austria, and France. This has been accompanied by an increase in antiimmigrant and anti-Islamist activism as disgruntled young men take to the streets and plazas of
Europe (Bartlett and Birdwell, 2011). Since 2001, the United States has been concerned with
how Europe manages its growing Muslim population and has encouraged measures to better
integrate these communities in order to curtail Islamist extremism. A 2011 report of the
Congressional Research Service notes that, “in light of the July 2011 killings in Norway by a
right-wing extremist disturbed by what he viewed as Islam’s growing influence in the
West...U.S. and European security services should cooperate on combating threats posed by
domestic radicals on both the extreme right and left” (Archick et al., 2011). In its 2003 Annual
Report of the Protection of the Constitution, the German security service reports that
The Internet has become the most important medium of communication for right wing extremists, who use
it to present themselves, make verbal attacks, carry on internal debates, and to mobilise attendance at their
rallies and demonstrations (BfV 2003: 24).

Given the potential security threat posed by extremist organizations, it is important that
intelligence agencies in the U.S. and Europe understand how they mobilize both “online” and
“offline.” A better understanding of the organizational structure of the nationalist subculture
may help policymakers understand how best to curtail the diffusion of xenophobic sentiments.
This research is part of a larger effort to incorporate social network analysis and
ethnographic methods into the study of far-right organizations and political phenomena more
generally. Baiocchi advocates the use of political ethnography, arguing that “close-up, on-theground observations of people and institutions in real time where the investigator detects how
and why agents act think and feel can offer special insights for the study of politics” (2008: 140).
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The body of far-right scholarship produced by political scientists has placed much of its
emphasis on the role of formal institutions (e.g. electoral engineering or coalition bargaining)
and has not paid enough attention to the encounters below formal politics. Taking a closer look
at the relationships between individuals who participate in far-right movements will provide
insight into the ways in which institutional arrangements and communication patterns are
produced.
2
2.1

EXISTING EXPLANATIONS OF THE FAR-RIGHT

Defining the Far-Right

The far-right is a heterogeneous entity. According to Mudde (1996), there are at least 26
definitions of the far-right in the literature, which identify 58 different characteristics. There
has been substantial debate over whether or not the far-right is a new phenomenon or merely a
resurgence of a preexisting fascist movements (Cole 2005, Rydgren 2005). Those who study
the contemporary far-right have referred to it as the “new right,” “nativist,” the “far-right,” the
“extreme right,” and “neo-fascist.” Most scholars have focused their efforts on defining the
characteristics of far-right political parties and have ignored non-party actors. For example,
Iganzi focuses exclusively on “anti-system” parties – parties that do not aim to change the
government, but to change the entire system of government (1992, 2003). There are a number
of problems with Ignazi’s method of classification, which he himself admits. By 2006, Ignazi
acknowledged that it was no longer possible to classify many of the parties he studied as
extremist because they had moderated over time. In addition, the anti-system element of his
definition is problematic, particularly since there have been several far-right parties that have
served in government. The anti-system component of Ignazi’s definition is simultaneously too
broad and too narrow to be useful in discerning whether or not a party should be classified as
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far-right. In addition, by focusing exclusively on far-right parties, Ignazi’s definition excludes
the extremist milieu, which is comprised of a variety of actors including paramilitary
organizations, student organizations, skinheads, and Oi! bands. These actors have no interest
in participating in government, yet they play a vital role in propagating nationalist ideology
and frequently participate in political activities including party recruitment, nationalist
summits, youth trainings, and demonstrations.
Hartmann et al. (1985) define right-wing extremism as an umbrella term for all
“progress-hostile forces.” This term is simultaneously too broad and too narrow. Some farright parties, like the N-VA, are very concerned with economic progress. In addition, the
emphasis on being hostile to progress excludes some of the other prominent features of the
far-right, specifically their use of xenophobic or nationalist rhetoric. In contrast to Hartmann’s
study that focuses on one vague and inadequately defined characteristic, there are others who
feel that a party must meet a whole host of characteristics in order to be included. For
example, Falter and Schumann (1988) have ten elements in their definition of far-right
extremism and require that all ten elements be met.
Subsequent scholars have added to our understanding of the far-right by acknowledging
its complexity and declaring that it cannot be labeled as a single issue party or one that it is
defined solely by its oppositionist stance. Kitschelt noted that the new far-right is complex
and argued that they are characterized by a combination of neoliberal economic policies with
authoritarian politics and a limitation of individual autonomy (Kitschelt 1995: 2). Yet, not all
far-right parties have embraced the free market. One of the most successful far-right parties,
Hungary’s Jobbik, advocates for state regulation of the economy and protectionist policies.
There is no uniformity of the far-right’s economic preferences. Jamie Bartlett with the
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London think tank, Demos, notes that the “far-right is struggling to weave an economic story
into their message. They don’t have a coherent story to tell” (The Economist). There is
variation in the economic policies of the far-right across time and space. Some parties, like
the Vlaams Belang, advocated for a mixed economy in the 1970s, but have moved in a more
neoliberal direction since.
The ability to define the far-right through an economic lens becomes even more
complicated when one moves beyond political parties to the broader extremist network. For
example, the Flemish paramilitary organization Voorpost, does not mention economic policy
at all in its agenda, and focuses exclusively on a Flemish nationalist and anti-immigrant
agenda. Similarly the British street movement the English Defence League, has no clear
economic agenda and focuses instead on combating multiculturalism and the “Islamicization”
of Britain. Therefore, it is difficult if not impossible to use economic policy as a means of
ideologically unifying the wide variety of organizations that fall under the far-right umbrella.
Rather, it is better to focus on the cultural ideology of these groups and the exclusive way in
which they define who should and should not be part of the nation.
Many scholars have characterized the ideology of the far-right as populist (Taggart
1995, Bornschier 2010, Swank and Betz 2003, Rydgren 2005). Betz suggests the far-right be
defined by their “opposition to social integration of marginalized groups, and in their appeal to
xenophobia, if not overt racism,” and notes that they are “populist…in their appeal to the
common man and his allegedly superior common sense” (Betz 1993: 413). It is true that many
far-right organizations use populist rhetoric, yet to describe them as populist can be
misleading because not all populists are xenophobic.

Populist rhetoric is used by democratic

and antidemocratic organizations, by the pariahs and by the mainstream. Isaiah Berlin notes
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that the term lacks clarity and that it is often applied in situations when it does not fit:
There exists a shoe – the word “populism” – for which somewhere exists a foot.
There are all kinds of feet which it nearly fits, but we must not be trapped by
these nearly fitting feet. The prince is always wandering about with the show;
and somewhere, we feel sure, there awaits a limb called pure populism (Canovan
1981).

Due to this lack of conceptual clarity, it is best not to require that organizations use populist
rhetoric in order to be included under the far-right umbrella. It is better to focus on the first
aspect of Betz’s definition which emphasizes xenophobic appeals and overt racism.
Cas Mudde was one of the first to acknowledge the importance of studying not only
far-right parties, but also nationalist subgroups. He acknowledged that far-right parties do not
exist in isolation, rather, they are part of a broader far-right family (1996). Mudde asserts that
the defining feature of the far-right is nativism, which he defines as an “ideology which holds
that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (the nation) and
that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous
nation-state” (2007:19). He also notes that these groups are characterized by the use of
populist rhetoric and their belief in a strictly ordered society. Mudde’s system is broad enough
to encompass groups that are explicitly racist and those that are preservationist. It is also
inclusive of both neo-fascist organizations and those that are willing to participate within the
existing democratic system. Ultimately what binds the far-right together is nativism and a
desire to protect and defend their exclusive definition of the nation. This means that the farright will perceive immigration and asylum as a threat to their exclusive definitions of the
nation, and will typically advocate for more restrictive immigration policies, repatriation of
immigrants, or engage in acts of violence against immigrants. Mudde’s definition of the farright is broad enough to includes parties, like the Vlaams Belang, who advocate for restrictive
immigration and asylum policies in the desire to preserve the Flemish nation, and non-party
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actors like the English Defense League, who do not participate formally in politics, but use
violent anti-immigrant street demonstrations to demonstrate their preference that Britain exist
for Brits alone.
This paper will follow Mudde’s (2007) system of far-right classification, which is
inclusive of both party and nonparty actors. These actors vary widely in the strategies they
use to communicate their policy preferences- ranging from electoral politics, to street politics,
to music, to interest groups, they ultimately are united by their belief that foreigners pose a
threat to the nation and that action should be taken to decrease, if not eliminate, this foreign
influence. In contemporary Europe, the majority of these groups are focused on the perceived
threat posed by Muslim immigration and want to see more restrictive immigration and asylum
policies (particularly on immigration from the Maghreb and the Middle East). They also want
to limit the cultural diffusion of Islam by placing limitations on visible symbols of Islam (bans
of the hijab and minarets). In addition to Islamophobia, there are several nativist actors
(especially those in France, Hungary, and Italy) who perceive the Roma community as a threat
to their nations and want to see Roma expulsion or repatriation and the existing Roma camps
destroyed.
2.2

Theories of Far-Right Emergence

Much of the literature on far-right parties seeks to explain the emergence or rise in popularity of
far-right organizations. This literature has a tendency to treat the emergence of the far-right as
something pathological, a deviation from the norm in generally tolerant and progressive Western
democracies. Existing explanations can be categorized into two camps: demand-side
explanations and supply-side explanations. Demand-side explanations place emphasis on broad
socioeconomic factors that have the ability to change the preferences, beliefs, and attitudes of
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voters. Many believe that the resurgence of the far-right is a consequence of globalization and
the instability that accompanies economic liberalization (Betz 1998). Ignazi (2006) believes that
the far-right emerged to meet the unfulfilled demands of the “losers” of
industrialization. According to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, capital mobility leads to a
decline in relative wages and employment for low-skilled workers. Given that the primary
support base for many far-right parties are poorly educated male industrial workers, there is
some logic behind the explanation that radical right parties emerged to meet the needs of those
whose needs are not being met in the current economic system. However, Art (2011) cautions
against focusing solely on economic explanations, particularly when it comes to the
sustainability of far-right parties. For example, he states that there are some countries, like
Austria, with low unemployment where the far-right has been extremely successful, while in
other countries with high unemployment, like Germany and Belgium, these parties have failed to
achieve representation.
Following the logic of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, Swank and Betz (2003) argued
that states with generous systems of social protection will offset support for the radical
right. This is consistent with Garrett’s (1998) argument about the compensation function of the
welfare state. Similarly, Andrew Geddes (2003: 123-125) believes that welfare states more
efficiently integrate immigrant populations, thereby minimizing the economic and social
ghettoization of immigrant populations that can eventually fuel nativist sentiment. He believes
that corporatist decision-making structures helped Sweden and the Netherlands recruit and
integrate migrant labor and helped foster public support for multiculturalism. However, this
argument cannot explain why strong welfare states, like Denmark, have failed to embrace
multiculturalism and have been home to successful anti-immigrant parties.
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Supply-side explanations emphasize the ways in which changes in the political
opportunity structure facilitate the rise of far-right parties. Kitschheimer (1966) described the
Western party system as one in which professionalized “catch-all” parties develop broad-based
platforms in order to capture the widest possible range of voters. This should mean that
moderate parties will enjoy the most electoral success and that parties with more radical
ideological agendas will be crowded out. However, Ignazi (2003) suggests that the move
towards the center has created a deficit of democratic representation that can be filled by new
political entrepreneurs. Similarly, Kitschelt argues that the radical right will be successful only
when a convergence of Social Democrats and Moderate Conservative Parties creates an electoral
opening for the far-right:
Whether a successful New Radical Right party emerges depends on the opportunity structure of party
competition. Only if voters are sufficiently disaffected with the existing moderately conservative and
moderately leftist or social democratic parties will the reservoir of potential right-authoritarian voters rally
around a new political force (1995: 14).

However, an opening in the political opportunity structure does not guarantee that far-right
parties will be electorally successful. In order to perform well at the polls, Kitschelt (1995)
argues that these parties need to pursue the “winning formula:” an anti-immigrant, pro-market
policy platform. He believes this attracts both small business owners and blue collar workers,
allowing far-right parties to establish the cross-cutting cleavages necessary to compete with their
mainstream rivals. For example, McGann and Kitschelt (2005) suggest that the Swiss People’s
Party (SVP) evolved towards the “winning formula,” adopting an anti-internationalist and
authoritarian position which allowed it to expand its support base to blue-collar workers. Yet it
is not entirely clear that far-right parties are filling in a representation gap. In fact, Bale (2003)
believes that the presence of these parties tends to reinforce the conventional bipolar political
system. While the media often present the far-right as a pariah, Bale argues that, in reality, the
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far-right is integrated with center right parties. In fact, the center right may incorporate aspects
of the far-right agenda and cooperate with the far-right in coalition governments. For example,
in Italy, the far-right Lega Nord (Northern League, LN) became a coalition partner for the
center-right party Forza Italia (Forward Italy, FI). In Austria, the Christian Democratic
Österreichische Volkspartei (Austrian People’s Party, OVP) and the Social-Democratic Party
(SPO) have been known to coopt policies from the far right party Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs
(Freedom Party of Austria, FPÖ. Overall, Bale finds that while the ugly sisters have been
invited to the ball, Cinderella is still winning, and the center tends to cannibalize the smaller
parties.
It is also unclear that the “winning formula” is what fosters far-right sustainability. The
weaknesses in Kitschelt’s theory became apparent when many far-right parties abandoned
neoliberalism in favor of welfare chauvinism. Scholars have noted that neoliberalism was merely
one among many economic programs pursued in their efforts to maximize vote share (Mudde
2000; Lubbers 2001). In addition, Van der Brug (2005:543) notes that Kitschelt does not study
the ideological platforms of parties, but the policy preferences of their supports, thus, “given the
large similarities among the ideological positions of voters for various (successful as well as
unsuccessful) radical right-wing parties, the results of Kitschelt’s analyses do not tell us that
specific ideological positions of anti-immigrant parties yield the winning formula.” While the
economic component of Kitschelt’s “winning formula” may not be necessary, there is some
evidence that suggests that the anti-immigrant agenda is essential. Ivarsflaten (2008: 3) finds
that while some far-right parties experienced success without mobilizing economic grievances,
none of them performed well without mobilizing grievances over immigration.
A large body of scholarship predicts that the trajectory of far-right parties will be
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determined by the institutional structure in which they are embedded. The prediction is that it
will be more difficult for far-right parties to be successful in majoritarian “winner takes all”
systems, in which, according to Duverger’s law, power tends to alternate between two
mainstream parties. However, in proportional systems, where legislative seats are awarded
proportional to vote share, it should be more likely for smaller parties to achieve
representation. Following this logic, within PR systems, the likelihood of far-right
representation should decrease as the electoral threshold increases. It is true that, if one
measures success in terms of the number of seats, there appears to be a clear relationship
between threshold and far-right representation; however, if you look at vote share the picture
changes. Studies have demonstrated (Carter 2005; Norris 2005) that there is not statistically
significant relationship between the type of electoral system and vote share for the radical
right. Art (2011:16) notes that the majoritarian system in France has not prevented the Front
National from achieving a large percentage of the vote share. In addition, Arzheimer and Carter
(2002) find evidence that, surprisingly, the vote share for the radical right actually increases as
the disproportionality of the system increases. Thus, while it is important to control for the type
of electoral system, evidence suggests the need to look beyond institutional explanations when
explaining variations in party trajectories.
2.3

The Nationalist Subculture and Party Sustainability

Much of the literature on far-right parties over the past two decades focused on why these parties
emerged or resurged. Very few studies attempted to predict which parties would fragment or
disappear and which would enjoy sustained electoral success. As Art (2011) notes, “when one
looks more closely at the trajectories of radical right parties in particular sets of cases, it becomes
clear that existing theories cannot account for the variation in their success across different
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regions or countries.” In an effort to fill this gap in the literature, Art suggests that party
sustainability is influenced by the nationalist subculture and the permissiveness of the political
environment. Art believes preexisting nationalist organizations are essential for right-wing
parties to succeed as they provide a core of activists and a familiar brand. Far-right parties fail,
not because of the institutional structure or broad socioeconomic conditions, but because of
factionalism, organizational chaos, and internal pathologies (Art 2011:5). So the key to far-right
success is whether that party has been built on constructive or destructive foundations.
In order to assess the level of cohesion in the nationalist subculture, it is necessary to
examine the ties between far-right parties and extremist organizations. Extremist organizations
are often so small in number that they are not expected to have a significant impact on electoral
outcomes. As a consequence, these organizations have received insufficient attention from
scholars of the far-right. Mudde notes that “most comparative scholars of the extreme right
focus on (successful) political parties, while nonparty organizations tend to feature only in
single-country studies which often tend to be fairly idiosyncratic and difficult to use in crossnational comparisons” (2005: 165). He suggests that such studies fail to appreciate the variety
of ways in which the far-right organizes and that the trajectory of far-right parties may be
influenced by whether extremist organizations are integrated or isolated in the far-right
network. Similarly, Art (2011) suggests the relationship between extremist organizations and
far-right parties may be important to understanding party viability. He notes that one reason
parties fail is because of a “tiny and balkanized extremist subculture that nonetheless managed to
derail radical right party building despite its small size (2011: 23).

In order to assess the impact of the nationalist subculture, it is important to make sure
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the concept is clearly defined. While it is possible to trace the ideological continuity between
contemporary and past far-right movements, Art cautions that the “mere presence of a significant
far-right movement at some point in history cannot explain the success of contemporary radical
right parties…” (2011: 106). For Art, a strong nationalist subculture requires a critical historical
juncture, for example World War II, which links the past to contemporary outcomes. In this
sense, Art’s argument is path dependent. If, at the critical juncture, the far-right in a given
country is decimated or factionalized, the nationalist subculture will be weak from that point
forward. However, if the critical juncture provided the far-right with an opportunity to unite and
mobilize, it can produce a more cohesive subculture. However, Art’s theory lacks conceptual
clarity. Specifically, he does not demonstrate that the strength of the nationalist subculture can
be measured objectively. It is unclear how to distinguish a strong from a weak nationalist
subculture or assess variations in strength among states within the two categories. This article
suggests that it is not possible or even desirable to capture the complexity of nationalist
organization with a dichotomous variable. Rather, it is best to think of the degree of
centralization within the nationalist subculture as a continuum that ranges from anarchic to
hierarchic.
Determinations of what constitutes a “critical juncture” are made somewhat arbitrarily
by the researcher. As Hogan acknowledges:
The concept of critical junctures lacks rigour-it doesn’t offer a basic set of criteria by which to assess
potential critical junctures to discover if they are critical junctures or just change that has taken place
incrementally…Where does one draw the line as to what is, and what is not, a critical juncture? This is
the decisive weakness at the heart of the approach (2006: 663).

Another problematic element of Art’s theory is that it suggests the nationalist subculture
becomes “locked in,” or that change is only possible during a critical juncture. More recently,
historical institutionalists, without denying the existence of critical junctures, have stressed that
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more attention be paid to gradual institutional change. For example, Thelen (2004) introduces
the concepts of institutional layering, changing some elements of an institution while leaving
others in place, and institutional conversion, whereby existing institutions are redirected to a new
purpose. These concepts are better-suited to improving our understanding of the trajectories of
far-right parties. For example, institutional layering helps us understand the trajectory of Italy’s
far right Lega Nord (Northern League, LN). Since its foundation, the Lega Nord has been a
northern regionalist party. While regionalism remains at the core of the party, beginning in the
mid-1990s, the party radicalized and adopted secessionist and anti-immigrant
positions. (Huysseune, 2001-2002). Similarly, the Swiss People’s Party originated as the Party
of Farmers, Traders, and Independents (BGB), a conservative agrarian party. Over the years, it
continued to pursue a moderate political agenda until the Zurich branch of the party, under the
leadership of Christoph Blocher, began to radicalize the party platform in the 1970s, politicizing
asylum policy and European integration. Thus it is not clear that any critical juncture served to
crystallize the foundation of the nationalist subculture that facilitated the electoral success of
these parties. Rather, the parties appear to have evolved gradually over time, keeping their
institutional foundations intact, and modifying their policy platforms when necessary to ensure
institutional survival.
2.4

Social Networks and the Far-Right

Social networks can illuminate the ways the parties mobilize in an era of unstable party systems.
Many have said that, after decades of stability, the party system in Europe has become unfrozen:
that mass party organizations are disappearing and traditional partisan loyalties are on the
decline. Williams and Gulati assert, “ as fewer people are members of traditional civic
associations, it is here that we see a new frontier for cultivating social capital, which candidates,
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elected officials, and civic leaders can tap when wanting to mobilize citizens for political action”
(2007:20). While there is a large literature on the relationship between political parties and civil
society, it is only recently that scholars have begun to study the ways in which a party may use
the Internet to mobilize its support base.
A social network is defined as a “set of people, organizations, or other social entities
connected by a set of socially meaningful relationships…” (Bih-Ru Lea et al., 2006: 122). These
relationships may include friendships, alliances, collaboration, and information exchanges. While social
network analysis initially focused on “real world” relationships, there is a growing interest in
online social networks and computer-mediated communication. The computer enables actors to
exchange information and resources that “can be communicated to others via textual, graphical,
animated, audio, or video-based media-for example, sharing information, (news or data), discussing
work, giving support, or providing companionship” (Garton et al. 1999: 78). The internet is a new
frontier for the creation of social networks, as it provides forums for communication and the
construction of online public spaces (Cammaerts, 2009). This study, rather than focusing on the
interpersonal relationships of individuals, will focus on the network as a whole and examine the
relationships between all organizations that are members of a specified population: the far-right
(Garton et al. 1999: 82). This whole network analysis provides an opportunity to discern which
actors are at the core and the periphery of the network and to determine how an organization’s
position within the network impacts its behavior.
One way of measuring the ties between actors in an online network is by examining
hyperlinks between organizational websites. Scholars who study computer mediated
communication argue that an organizational website can be conceptualized as actors and that
their use of hyperlinks reflects the communicative choices of the website owner (Caiani and
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Wagemann 2009; Jackson 1997). Through hyperlinks, organizations are able to direct users to
information about other organizations in the network, influence another website’s authority or
credibility, and to communicate shared interest (Kleinberg, 1999; Park 2003; Mislove 2007).
Ackland and Gibson note that, “through hyperlinks, groups can share their audience and thus
reinforce their message, conveying a sense of a wider world of supportive and sympathetic
voices.” (2004:1).
While initially dismissed as irrelevant, there is a growing sense that online social
networks can impact real-world political outcomes. Bartlett et al. (2011) argue that this
“mélange of virtual and real-world political activity is the way millions of people-especially
young people-relate to politics in the twenty-first century” (2011: 15). There is evidence to
suggest that participation in online social networks is more than armchair activism and that
websites can have a significant impact on electoral outcomes. Gibson and McAllister’s (2005)
study of the 2004 Australian elections found that having a web site increased a candidate’s vote
share by 2%. Similarly, Williams and Gulati (2007)’s study of the 2006 midterm elections in the
United States demonstrates that Facebook support had a significant effect on a candidate’s final
vote share. Bartlett et al.’s (2011) study of Facebook supporters of far-right parties finds that
67% of the online supporters of a party voted for that party at the most recent election.
The Internet may be a particularly powerful tool for mobilization for far-right parties,
which may be treated as pariahs and excluded from the mainstream media. Michael Whine
(1997, 1999) was one of the earliest scholars to draw attention to the affinity between the farright and the Internet, noting that its anonymity, lack of regulation, and accessibility to young
audiences make it ideal for the diffusion of racist and xenophobic ideologies. While extremist
organizations may be small in number, in the online public space, the use of links between sites
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within a network help to “forge a stronger sense of community and purpose,” convincing,
“…even the most ardent extremist that he is not alone, that his views are not, in fact, extreme at
all.” (Quoted in Ackland and Gibson 2000: 9). Gerstenfeld et al. (2003) finds evidence that farright extremists use mutual links to create a collective identity and that these groups often use the
same borrowed rhetoric (2003: 29). Similarly, in their study of white supremacist sites, Burris,
Smith and Strahm (2000) find that the Internet has helped create a virtual extremist community
(p. 30).
While some do not believe that white supremacist organizations have a tangible impact
on the fate of political parties, there is evidence to suggest that-both on and offline, white
supremacist organizations have real political power. For example, in the aftermath of the Civil
War, the Ku Klux Klan operated as the terrorist wing of the Democratic Party and allowed the
party to operate underground during Reconstruction when its members were still forbidden to
vote or hold office (Perryman 2014). Similarly, there is evidence that the Klan bolstered the
Democratic Party in the Oregon legislature during the 1920s, leading to more restrictive policies
on alien land ownership (Lalande 1992). More recently, there is evidence that white
supremacists on social media follow and are followed by the Donald Trump campaign on
Twitter. 67.5% of the influencers of the white supremacist #WhiteGenocide online group are
followers of Donald Trump, some of whom retweet his posts and provide links to his campaign
website. Regardless of whether or not politicians formally acknowledge relationships with white
supremacist organizations, there is evidence that white supremacist organizations have shaped
politics as they actively diffuse policy messages and endorse political candidates (Kharakh and
Primack 2016).
The 2011 Oslo massacre by Anders Breivik heightened the sense of urgency to
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understand the relationship between online extremism and real-world political violence as it was
believed the Breivik’s views were shaped, in part, by his participation in the anti-Islamist
blogosphere (Eriksen, 2011). Beyond the Oslo massacre, recent years have witnessed an increase
in street-based extremist movements throughout Europe, which often incite violence. Thus
scholars and policy-makers are concerned with whether extremist organizations are using the
Internet as a tool to mobilize people to take to the streets. In their study of Facebook supporters
of the largest British extremist organization, the English Defence League (EDL), Barlett and
Littler (2011) find that roughly half of the supporters participated in a protest or march (2011: 4).
In sum, there is a growing interest in how extremist organizations use the Internet to
facilitate their activities. However, many have merely identified or described existing extremist
web sites (Qin et al. 2010: 77). In addition, while scholars have studied the links extremist
organizations have with their international counterparts, none have examined the links between
these organizations and parliamentary parties. This study will go beyond description and provide
a systematic analysis of the structure and content of far-right networks using tools of social
network analysis.
Social network analysis originated in the field of sociology, but has since been
incorporated into a variety of fields including communications, anthropology, economics,
geography, and sociolinguistics. While its use in political science has been relatively limited,
some International Relations scholars have used it to describe the structure of intergovernmental
and international non-governmental networks (Burton et al., 2009: 32). For example, Jason
Beckfield argues that states with “structural privilege” within IGO and INGO networks “are able,
to a significant degree, to set agendas, frame debates, and promulgate policies that benefit them”
(Beckfield 2003: 404). This is similar to Barnett and Duvall’s (2005) concept of “structural
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power,” which asserts that states that occupy positions of power within global structures have a
greater ability to alter outcomes in their favor. However, the International Relations literature on
networks has been largely descriptive and it is necessary for it to move towards a more empirical
investigation of network structures and their effects (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009: 27). In addition,
the scope of application of SNA in Political Science needs to be broadened to include an analysis
of a wider variety of networks.
The social movement literature examines how networks link a multiplicity of actors
and influence coalition-building and collective action (Gerlach and Hine 1970). Scholars within
this literature have argued that networks “contribute to organizational formation, sometimes in
rough forms of block recruitment and other times by providing the necessary links between the
founders. They may also provide the basis for factions and coalitions within organizations. The
insights gained from the study of social movements have relevance to the study of far-right
parties, whose actions may also be constrained or enabled by the broader networks in which they
are embedded. There has been substantial discussion of how the organizational structure of
individual parties influences electoral success; however there has been relatively little discussion
on the structure of the broader far-right political movement. I argue that it is important to use
social network analysis in order to understand the direct and indirect ties between organizations
within this movement, explore how information is exchanged, and determine whether or not the
organizations within it are pooling mobilization resources.
One example of the application of social network analysis to the far-right is Anheier’s
(2003) study of the rise of the National Socialist party in Germany. He argues that the success of
the Nazis “lay neither in the divisive Weimar party system nor in volatile voter behaviour alone;
they also resided in the ‘prepolitical field’ of local milieus, associations, networks, and

23

movements.” (p. 51). By being embedded in the wider nationalist organization infrastructure,
activists had lower transaction costs and were more readily able to recruit members and establish
local party organizations.
2.5

Discourse Analysis of the Far-Right

Discourse analysis originated in linguistics, but has since expanded to a variety of disciplines
including anthropology, sociology, communication, and political science. It is primarily
concerned with how people use language to communicate. Fairclough defines discourse as a
particular way of representing aspects of the world (2003: 124). Like constructivists, discourse
analysts assert that the social world is constructed, often through language, thus the world cannot
be understood without analyzing discourse (Phillips and Hardy 2002). Discourse analysts
believe that language plays an essential role in the construction of social identities and in
creating and maintaining power structures. According to Gee, discourse analysis is concerned
with how language is “used ‘on site’ to ‘pull off’ specific social activities and social identities
(‘memberships’ in various social groups, cultures, and institutions” and he asserts “language-inuse is everywhere and always political.” (1999: 1)
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is specifically interested in the relationship between
language and power. It examines how relationships of dominance and discrimination are
manifested in language. Often discourse is perceived as an instrument used by those in power to
maintain their dominant position (Wodak and Meyer 2001; Van Leeuwen 1993). For example,
Habermas claims “language is a medium of domination and social force. It serves to legitimize
relations of organized power” (quoted in Wodak and Meyer 2001: 2). However, it is important
to recognize that texts are not just vehicles of domination, but also avenues through which
competing discourses struggle for domination (Wodak and Meyer 2001: 11). While far-right
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parties are typically not the dominant political actors in the societies in which they are
embedded, the discourse used by the far-right is a reflection of the power dynamics within the
nationalist subculture. This study intends to explore the ways in which discourse contributes to
or undermines the success of far-right parties.
While recognizing the utility of CDA’s assertion that there is a relationship between
language and power structures, this study will rely primarily on the methodology of content
analysis, rather than CDA. Content analysis is more systematic than CDA, asks more concrete
questions, making it better suited for systematically testing hypotheses. Content analysis is a
“research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context”
(Krippendorff 1989: 403). It involves a quantification of the “what” messages communicate
(Laswell 1948). Content analysis involves an analysis of a large body of “real life” language use
which is referred to as a corpus (McEnery and Wilson 1996: 1). Quantitative analysis of a
corpus involves identifying certain properties, like the frequency with which certain words or
word pairs are used, and making inferences based on these properties (Biber et al. 1998; Baker
2006). It also requires a systematic method of extracting the most frequent recurrent strings
from a large corpus, for example by specifying a cut-off frequency. Through word frequency
lists and keyword analysis, I can identify discursive patterns within a pattern and the network in
its entirety. This will provide an opportunity to test the theory that a party’s ideological position
relative to the broader network can shape its sustainability. Content analysis is the most
applicable method for the theory I intend to test, namely that a party’s ideological position
relative to the broader networks can shape its sustainability.
With the emergence and diffusion of new technology, there has been increased scholarly
interest in computer-mediated communication and the creation of online discursive communities
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(Acquisti and Gross 2006, Cherny 1999). Computer-mediated discourse is defined as the
communication produced when human beings interact with one another by transmitting
messages via networked computers…distinguished by its focus on language and language
use in computer networked environments and by its use of methods of discourse analysis
to address that focus (Herring 2015: 127).
Some studies of computer-mediated discourse focus on the medium itself-for example how
people communicate differently via Facebook, email, or Twitter. However, this study will be
more discourse-centered than medium-centered, with a specific focus on the patterns of
communication of the far-right online.
The literature on the discourse of far-right parties is relatively sparse, with the majority of
emphasis having been placed on institutional or sociocultural factors that explain far-right
success. However, as the structure of European party systems is changing and conventional
party loyalties are weakening, scholars have become increasingly concerned with the ways in
which parties market themselves (Norris 2004, Lin 2004). Scholars of political marketing have
increasingly turned to discourse analysis, which is used in the marketing literature to understand
identity and power relations, and explain how the success of the extreme right can be interpreted
in terms of making discursive connections with voters (Moufahim et al. 2010: 541). For
example, Patrick de Vos (2002) argues that the upsurge in popularity of the anti-immigrant party
the Vlaams Blok (Flemish Blok, VB) can be explained by the party’s ability to blend the
discourse of xenophobic populism with separatist nationalism. Anastasakis suggests that farright parties have been successful, in part, because of their highly opportunistic use of
discourse. He notes that while all the far-right parties have a common ideological core of
xenophobia, ultra-nationalism, and hatred of immigrants, the most successful parties, like the
Freedom Party in Austria, have moderated their discourse, embracing a catchall ideology in
order to reach as broad an audience as possible (2000:18). However, it is difficult to make
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generalizations about far-right discourse solely on the basis of analyses of individual parties. My
goal is to provide a comparative and systematic analysis of far-right discourse in order to reveal
discursive patterns across countries and determine whether there is a relationship between the
discursive structure of the nationalist subculture and far-right success.
2.6

A New Approach to Far-Right Networks
2.6.1. Networks and Party Sustainability

I argue that the sustainability of far-right parties is influenced by the nationalist
subculture. However, while Art focuses on the characteristics of potential party members
(radicals vs. activists) and critical historical junctures, I emphasize the organizational structure of
far-right networks. Closer examination of this structure will provide insight into whether farright parties, once established, will be destroyed from within due to factionalism. Several studies
have suggested that far-right organization influences party success. However, most studies of
far-right organization have focused on the party’s internal characteristics, and not on its
relationships with other far-right groups (Kitschelt 1995, Lubbers et al. 2002). Analyzing the
ways in which far-right parties cooperate or compete with other nationalist groups may help
scholars gain a better understanding of how successful parties mobilize their support base. This
analysis also might help us understand why unsuccessful parties splinter due to division within
the nationalist movement.
In order to assess the organizational structure of the far-right, I use social network
analysis to examine the degree of centralization within the far-right network. I do this both
online, collecting data on the links between organizational websites, and offline, collecting data
on overlapping organizational memberships. I believe that parties that occupy a central position
within the far-right network will be better able to raise funds, recruit members, and diffuse
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information about their policy preferences. I also believe that highly centralized networks will
be less prone to factionalism.
Hypothesis 1: As centrality of the parliamentary party within the far-right network
increases, the likelihood of party sustainability increases.

According to social network theories, actors that occupy a central position within a
network have network power (Ibarra and Andrews 1993, Brass 1992). It may be useful for the
far-right to have strong connections with other far-right actors as it could enhance the party’s
ability to raise funds, recruit members, and diffuse information about their policies. There is also
a possibility that a party that occupies a central position within the network will be less prone to
factionalism. For example, De Witte and Verbeeck (1998) argue that the extreme right has been
successful in Belgium and not the Netherlands because the Vlaams Blok was able to cooperate
with Flemish-nationalist groups and clubs. And in Hungary, there is evidence to suggest that the
participation of the paramilitary organization, the Hungarian Guard, at Jobbik party rallies has
helped attract voters and intimidate members of the Roma community to prevent them from
opposing anti-Roma policies (Waterfield, 2010; Day 2010).
Hypothesis 2: As the ideological centrality of party within a network increases, party
sustainability increases.

A preexisting nationalist subculture can be an advantage for a far-right party, but this advantage
may be negated if the party has to struggle with rival ideological factions. I argue that the
ideological structure of the nationalist subculture can influence party sustainability. In When
Parties Fail, Lawson and Merkl (1998) describe how the parties are threatened when alternative
organizations emerge as competitors. Factionalism has repeatedly undermined the success of farright parties (Givens 2005). Fitzmaurice describes the factionalism of the francophone far-right
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in Belgium:
The French-speaking extreme right has seemed ‘groupusculaire’, fractious, divided, insubstantial,
amateurish and unable to choose a clear strategy as between forms of ‘entryism’ on the fringes of the
traditional Christian Social and Liberal parties of the right, romantic violence and destabilisation through
links with paramilitary groups and limited infiltration of security services, ideological debate such as the
so-called revisionist or neo-occidentalist philosophies, as against electoralism. (Fitzmaurice 1992: 305-6)

A party that is not near the ideological center of the broader network is more vulnerable
to ideological competitors and factionalism as there will be rivals who do not feel that the party
is representative of their ideology or interests. In addition, a lack of ideological cohesion within
the party can influence the internal organization of a party, making it more likely that the party
will divide into factions. There is often a divide between pragmatists, who are willing to
moderate the party platform for votes and hardliners who are reluctant to weaken the
movement’s ideological purity. For example, in the 1990s, there was a divide within the Front
Nationale between Jean-Marie Le Pen and Bruno Megret, who disapproved of Le Pen’s
extremism and anti-Semitic rhetoric (Givens 2005:105). Megret split from the party in 1998 to
form the Mouvement National Republicain (National Republican Movement, MNR). While this
split did not destroy the FN, certainly splits of this sort have the potential to destroy far-right
parties, particularly if there is a lot of support for the ideological position of the breakaway party
amongst nationalists.
2.6.2 Competitive Crowding in Networks
Hypothesis 3: As the asymmetry of a party’s overlap with a competitor in the network I
increases, its sustainability decreases

The Flemish nationalist subculture is well-established and the connections between its
organizations have facilitated party building. As David Art argues, “The support of the radical
wing of the Flemish national movement was critical for the VB in its early years.” (2008: 428)
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For example, in the early days of the Vlaams Blok, it was able to draw hardline members from
the preexisting Flemish national party, the Volksunie (People’s Union, VU) and the paramilitary
organization, Voorpost. However, the density of ties between Flemish nationalist organizations
can, paradoxically, make these organizations weaker, as they present opportunities for internal
competition and shifting loyalties. When organizations are too densely connected within a
network, they can become competitive for the loyalty of members. In their study of the
semiconductor industry, Podolny, Stuart, and Hannan (1996) found that there is a relationship
between niche position and organizational survival. Specifically, they found that a crowded
niche position is negatively associated with a firm’s survival. In order to assess whether a niche
has become crowded, one must measure the density of ties between similar organizations. In this
case, competitive crowding, is the sum of an organization’s overlapping memberships. These
overlaps are not necessarily symmetric, as some organizations will have more overlapping
memberships than others. The greater the asymmetry of the overlap, the stronger the competitive
effect of organization j on organization i. (Podolny et al. 1996: 666).
Table 2.1. Niche Overlap of Two Hypothetical Organizations
Area of overlap between Organization i and
Area of j that does not overlap with I
Organization j
25 overlapping members
Area of i that does not overlap with j

75 members

25 members

3
3.1

METHODOLOGY

Social Network Analysis

This study uses social network analysis to investigate the structure of the far-right’s online
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network. Social network analysis is a method used to study the relationship between individuals,
or nodes, within a network in order to identify “persistent patterns of association…that can
define, enable, or restrict the behavior of nodes” (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009:8). The concept of
a network has been interpreted broadly, ranging from tightly bound networks like tribal
communities to more loosely bound networks like those created by links between websites. The
strength of a tie is conceptualized as a combination of the magnitude and frequency of
interaction between the nodes. The structure of the network helps determine its usefulness to the
nodes within it: networks with tighter ties between the nodes may be more useful than those with
loose ties. In addition, a network’s usefulness to a node may depend on the node’s position
within the network. The primary way to measure this is the node’s centrality, which gives one a
sense of how important an individual node is to a given network. While there are a number of
ways to measure centrality, one of the most frequently used is degree centrality. Indegree
centrality is the number of ties that come in to a node from the broader network, whereas
outdegree centrality is the number of ties that the node directs out to others (Freeman 1979). As
a node’s centralization within a network increases, it accumulates more social capital, “more
easily accessing resources and information from other nodes…” that “may allow that node to
have the ability to shape the flow of information” (Hafner-Burton et al 2009: 570).
For the online network analysis, the nodes within the network are organizational websites
and the ties between them are hyperlinks (Park 2003, Barnett and Sung 2006). I constructed a
database of the far-right network organizational websites in three European countries: Belgium,
France and the UK, all of which have multiple far right parties competing within the same
electoral system and far right network. An organization was included in the far-right network on
the basis of whether or not it met Mudde’s criterion for inclusion in the far-right. Specifically,

31

an organization was included if it touted that the state “should be inhabited…by members of the
native group (the nation) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally
threatening to the homogenous nation-state” (2007:19). In constructing the database, I made use
of databases of hate groups constructed by the Wiesenthal Center, VOX-POL, the AntiDefamation League, and the Southern Poverty Law Center. In addition, groups were identified
for inclusion using relevant scholarship on the far-right in a given country. It is not possible to
construct a database of far-right organizational websites that is exhaustive as many of the sites
are temporary or have restricted access. While the dataset may be imperfect, it is still
worthwhile to examine the relationship between far-right organizations that have a prominent
and public online presence. Using a web crawler, I collected data on network centrality in three
European countries, operationalized as the number of incoming links from the broader network
to the parliamentary party’s homepage (Ackland 2010). The VOSON web crawler permits the
construct of network maps that allow one to visualize patterns of cooperation and contestation
within the broader network.
3.1.1

Dependent Variable: Party Sustainability

The study is ultimately concerned with how an organization’s network power influences its
sustainability. It suggests that interorganizational relationships might help predict which
parties will have a long lifespan and which will merely be a flash in the pan. In his study of
the nationalist subculture and party sustainability, Art (2011) defines a sustainable party as
one that receives 5% of the vote share in three successive parliamentary elections. His goal is
to move beyond explanations of far-right party emergence in order to predict the trajectories
far-right parties will take once they have been established. However, Art’s measurement still
defines sustainability solely in terms of electoral performance and ignores other dimensions of
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organizational continuity. In addition, by making party sustainability a dichotomous variable,
Art fails to capture the full extent of variation in party trajectories. The measure of party
sustainability I advocate includes the following elements: durability and modality. A party’s
durability is a measure of the number of years it has been an operation.
Modality is the number of times it has exceeded the representation threshold and gained seats
in the legislature. Dividing a party’s modality by its durability provides a sense of how the
party has performed over the course of its lifespan.
3.1.2

Network Centrality

The key independent variable of interest is network centrality. I intend to measure the centrality
of both online and offline networks of the far-right. For the online networks, my primary
measurement is the party’s indegree centrality, or the number of incoming links to the party’s
website from the broader network. This data has been collected using VOSON, a service that
crawls all of the sites within a given network. In social network analysis, links are understood to
be ties of affinity between actors within the network. In order to assure that the links are being
used in this manner, I took a representative sample from my universe of cases and analyze the
links in context.
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Figure 3.1 Visualization of the Centrality of Hungary's Far-Right Network

3.1.3

Niche Competition

Far-right parties can be vulnerable to internal competition within the network. This competitor
can capture some of the party’s members, ultimately hurting the party’s performance. I
hypothesize that as the asymmetry of party’s overlapping membership increases relative to a
competitor, its sustainability decreases. Due to the nature of far-right organizations, many of
them do not publicize membership data. Because of this, and due to the fact that this study is
concerned in part with online networks, overlapping memberships will focus on an
organization’s Twitter followers. While all of the followers of a far-right organization on
Twitter are not necessarily active members of the community offline, following an organization
on Twitter is an indication of a willingness to belong to an organization’s online social network
(Ye and Wu 2010).

In addition, it is useful for an organization to have a large number of

Twitter followers, as this increases its network power and its ability to diffuse information
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(Bakshy et al. 2012). Using Followerwonk and my own database of Twitter followers, I
compared the Twitter followers of actors in the far-right network in order to evaluate whether
there is a substantial overlap in membership. The total number of overlapping members for two
organizations was divided by the total number of followers of that organization (Podolny, Stuart,
and Hannan 1996). This analysis helps identify which organizations are niche competitors
within the network. In addition to the online analysis, I conducted interviews with
representatives from far-right organizations in order to collect additional information about
overlapping organizational ties and the ways in which interorganizational relationships are
perceived by their members.
3.2

Discourse Analysis of the Far-Right

In spite of the wide range of research activities concerning extreme right-wing parties, their
ideology and their discourse has been given relatively little attention (Mudde 2000). In order to
assess the overall structure of the Belgian far-right network, I intend to use content analysis to
identify discursive patterns in the community. Content analysis is the “analysis of the manifest
and latent content of a body of communicated material through classification, tabulation, and
evaluation of its key symbols and themes in order to ascertain its meaning and probable effect”
(Krippendorff 1980: 1). In recent decades there has been increased attention paid to content
analysis of computer-mediated discourse (De Laat 2002). One way to identify the overarching
themes in a network is to examine meta-keywords. Meta-keywords “describe the main focus or
purpose of a website and are often embedded into the HTML to ensure appropriate ranking by
search engines” (Ackland and O’Neil 2011: 182). The VOSON program includes a text analysis
component, including information about meta-keyword frequencies. The meta- keywords are
from the homepages of each seed site, where organizations typically place the most important
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information about their organizations. While there are limitations on the inferences one can
draw from meta-keywords, it is a useful way to identity and compare the central focus of each
organization’s website. For example, in a crawl of the far-right network in the UK, the following
meta-keywords are used with the most frequency:
Table 3.1 Meta-Keywords in the British Far-Right Network
Frequency
10
6
5
4
3

Word
British
government, elections
young, foreign, cannibal
issue, website, death, happy, racial, African, political, democracy, European,
immigration
forged, society, change, Asian, own, law, fear, deny, views, money, workers, Muslim

I hypothesize that ideologically cohesive networks will produce more sustainable parties. In
order to test this hypothesis I examine the frequency with which certain types of discourse are
used by radical right parties and compare it to their use in the broader network. The most
frequently used meta-keywords were located in context on the organizational homepages and
classified into the following discursive genres: anti-establishment populism, xenophobia,
biological racism, and preservationism. While there are a wide variety of discourse employed
by the far-right, these types of discourse have been recognized as the main pillars of far-right
discourse in the existing literature (Guibernau 2010, Wilson and Hainsworth 2012). Each type of
discourse has been conceptually defined and can be identified through certain key words or
phrases. Anti-establishment populist discourse constructs a view of society where “the people”
are pitted against the powerful elite. Leaders frequently use “us versus them” rhetoric,
expressing opposition to the government or an elite group of individuals who wield power (Barr,
2009: 31). For example, Moufahim et al. (2010:549) notes how the Vlaams Blok’s discourse
includes a repertoire of confrontation:
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The words used in the text strengthen the dichotomy between the party and its supporters and the opponents
willing to bring it down. It is a) describing the action of the opponents with words such as: “forces”;
“endanger”; “killed”; “bury”; “execute”; “terrorism”; “non-founded reports”; “hate” which could associate
the opponent’ actions with undemocratic and violent practices; and b) describing actions related to the VB
with: “defend”; “fought for”; “protect”; “the good fight”; “bury” (but only in reaction to the establishment
attempt to bury the party), which relates the VB’s actions to the concept of self-defense (e.g. in 1991 the
theme of the VB’s campaign was self-defense and was illustrated by the image of boxing gloves).

In order to identify anti-establishment populism, I count the number of times the words
“government” and “EU” are clustered with a negative term. I collected data on the frequency
with which the phrase “the people” is used. I make this phrase country specific as well, for
example counting the number of times there is a reference to the “British people” in the UK or
the “Dutch people” in the Netherlands.
Xenophobia is defined as a fear or hatred of people or elements that are considered
alien. Xenophobic discourse makes clear distinctions between insiders and outsiders, “othering”
groups that are considered foreign, like immigrants and racial or ethnic minorities. In order to
identify xenophobic rhetoric, I counted the number of times immigrant/immigration was
clustered with a negative term. For example, xenophobic discourse often includes “metaphors of
threat,” like referring to an “invasion,” “river,” or “flood” of immigrants (Erjavec, 2003: 96). In
addition, there may be a reference to the “problem of immigration” or emphasis placed on the
relationship between immigration and crime. Other key phrases I will be searching for include
references to immigrants “failure to integrate,” “stealing jobs,” and “taking advantage of social
services” (Engelken-Jorge 2010). Biological racism is a more overt expression of racism than
xenophobia, as it stresses the innate differences between ethnic groups. It often depicts
foreigners as a biological threat to ethnic homogeneity and promotes a physical segregation of
the races (Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn, 1993: 24). Explicit references are made to the inferior
characteristics of specific ethnic groups. For example, there may be assertions that an ethnic
group is less intelligent, greedy, or prone to engage in criminal behavior. Thus, I search for the
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frequency with which a specific ethnic group is explicitly linked to a social problem. For
example, I quantified references to “Gypsy crime” or the “Jewish conspiracy.” In addition, I tried
to capture discourse that promotes physical segregation of the references by counting the
frequencies of language that promotes “ethnic cleansing” or condones “miscegenation.”
Finally, the contemporary far-right may not use overtly racist discourse against a
minority group, but prefer to portray their organization as the defender of Western values and a
protector of citizens who, in their view, have become marginalized within their own society.
Preservationism refers to discourse that portrays the far-right as a part of a wider project of
preserving endangered European identities (Guibernau 2010: 12, Liang 2007: 10). Key words
and phrases associated with this genre would be: protect, defend, preserve, Europe for
Europeans, national preference. In addition, I search for country-specific phrases that have been
employed by far-right parties in the past (e.g. “Britain for the British (National Front), “Denmark
for the Danes” (Danish People’s Party), “Bulgaria for the Bulgarians” (Ataka). While the
aforementioned discursive categories have been emphasized, I recognize that this list is not
exhaustive. The lexical analysis of the corpus also undoubtedly revealed other relevant forms of
discourse that were ultimately incorporated into the study, such as the discourse on law and order
that is used by the N-VA.
In addition to the analysis of the meta-keywords, I also created a concept map of the
Belgian far-right network in order to visualize the most frequency used words in the network and
identity conceptual hubs (Ackland 2010). While there are limitations to the conclusions that can
be drawn from these maps alone, it does provide insights into conceptual patterns in the network.
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3.2.1

Building a Corpus of Far-Right Discourse

The VOSON program collects data on meta-keyword frequencies; however one weakness of
the program is that it there may be limitations in its representativeness. The meta-keywords
are only from the homepages and therefore are not wholly representative of the entirety of an
organization’s discourse. To remedy this, I have constructed an original corpus of far-right
text. A corpus is defined as a “large body of naturally occurring language data,” that is
typically stored on computers (Baker 2006: 1). The corpus is a specialized corpus, as it does
not represent an entire body of language, but one specific genre of language. For example,
Baker et al. (2013) created a 140 million word corpus of British media discourse in order to
identify patterns in the way the media portrays Islam. Similarly, Posch et al. (2013) created a
corpus of German extremist discourse that included editorials, interviews, and campaign
materials in order to identify discursive patterns in German fascist rhetoric.
In order to ensure that the corpus is representative, I have followed the
recommendation that each contain a million words (Pearson 1998, Baker 2006: 27). In
addition, I have made efforts to ensure that my corpus contains a variety of forms of language.
Corpus-based analysis has revealed that there are substantial differences in grammar, lexis,
and discourse depending on the form of language that is used. Each corpus I have created has
internal variety and incorporates multiple linguistic forms. At the present moment, I have
constructed a corpus for the three Belgian far-right parties: the N-VA, the Vlaams Belang and
the Belgian Front Nationale. Each corpus is comprised of a variety of language including
online forums, campaign materials, twitter feeds, party manifestos, magazine articles,
Facebook posts, news articles, and speeches. The size and internal variety of each corpus help
guarantee that the corpus I have built is truly representative of each organization’s discourse.
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Each corpus has been constructed manually by cutting and pasting text-based website
content into a Word Document. Subsequently, the text was transferred into a Concordance
program, Wordsmith (2016)2 Like VOSON, Wordsmith collects data on word frequencies, but
these frequencies can be calculated as a percentage per 1,000 words in a 1 million word text file.
Relative frequency lists facilitate the ability to make comparisons across cases. Frequencies are
significant because, as Stubbs has argued, word choices are not neutral and reflect an ideological
position (1996: 107). He argues that “repeated patterns show that evaluative meanings are not
merely personal and idiosyncratic, but widely shared in a discourse community.” In addition,
Wordsmith allows the researcher to examine the context in which words are being used, which
will ultimately facilitate a more meaningful analysis than one might achieve through an
examination of word frequencies alone.
3.2.2

Keyword Analysis

The present study also employs keyword analysis to examine variations in
discourse between far-right parties. Keywords can be used to identify discursive
patterns within a network. Keywords are words that occur more frequently within a
body of text than would be expected by chance alone (Scott and Tribble 1996,
Baker and Ellece 2011). Keyword analysis involves examining a corpus and
identifying words that appear unusually frequently in comparison to the reference
corpus (Barbieri 2008: 64). This will allow me to identify similarities and
differences in the words used by far-right parties relative to one another. . The
corpus for the National Front cannot be compared to the others using keyword
2

Wordsmith is a software for those involved in corpus linguistics. It helps to identify patterns in language by
creating wordlists, concordances, and key words. For more information, see Mike Scott, 2016, Wordsmith Tools.
Stroud: Lexical Analysis Software.
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analysis as the text of this corpus is in French and the corpora are Flemish.
However, it is possible to compare the corpora for the two Flemish-speaking
parties: the N-VA and the Vlaams Belang.
Wordsmith (2016) was used to create word lists of the corpora that are being
compared: one for the Vlaams Belang Corpus and one for the N-VA Corpus.
Wordsmith compares the word lists and creates a key word list that based on a cross
tabulation of word frequencies in the word lists. Key words for each corpus are
those that are “unusually” frequent relative to the reference corpus. Each word is
ranked according to its “keyness” value or the statistical likelihood of its occurrence
relative to the reference corpus. Words with a positive keyness occur more
frequently that would be expected by chance in comparison with the reference
corpus and words with a negative keyness occur less frequently than would be
expected by chance relative to the reference corpus (Bondi and Scott 2010).
3.3

Interviewing the Belgian Far-Right: The Flemish Nationalist Network
The online network analysis will be accompanied by a qualitative comparison of the

political parties in Belgium: the Vlaams Belang, the N-VA, and the Belgian National Front.
Critics of quantitative research have charged that it only reveals simplistic correlations between
variables and fails to explain why or how outcomes occur (George and Bennett, 2005). To
remedy this, I will use case studies to identify the causal processes that link my independent and
dependent variables. Cases were chosen on the basis of variation on the independent variable, the
cohesion of the nationalist subculture. Following Mudde‘s (2005) typology, cases were chosen
on the basis of whether extremists organizations are integrated (Vlaams Belang, N-VA) or
isolated (Democratie Nationale) from a broader extremist network. There is substantial evidence
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to suggest that the successful far-right party in Belgium, the Vlaams Belang, has strong ties to
other Flemish nationalist organizations which have helped it mobilize its support base. In
contrast, the Belgian National Front is a lone wolf and has found it difficult to establish
relationships with other organizations. As a consequence, the party has been prone to
factionalism and has never enjoyed significant success.
In order to establish the causal mechanisms at work in the relationship between the
organizational structure of nationalist networks and party sustainability, I conducted field
research in Belgium. I conducted a series of semi-structured interviews with far-right party
representatives, members of extremist organizations, and members of nationalist student
organizations.
All of the organizations were a part of the broader Flemish nationalist movement. I chose
to accompany the online analysis with a qualitative approach in order to gain an understanding of
how individuals perceive and experience network structures. This gave me the opportunity to
talk to members firsthand and gain an in depth knowledge that is not necessarily provided by an
online analysis of network structures. Focusing on the Belgian far-right network as a case study
provides an opportunity for theory-testing and allows me to move beyond the simplistic
correlations between variables that characterize statistical analysis and illuminate the casual
mechanisms at work.
3.3.1

Population Data and Recruitment

The medium size subject pool (40) allows the researcher to sample across the spectrum
(including both policy elites and rank and file activists). Due to time constraints and the
difficulty in attaining access to these types of participants, limiting the study to 40 participants is
reasonable. The sample size is small enough to permit in-depth interviews and open-ended
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questions, yet larger enough that there is reason to believe the findings could be generalizable for
the Belgian far-right network on the whole.
Because the aim of this research is to understand far-right networks, subjects used for
interviews were selected based on their membership in a far-right party or organization. There
were four organizations studied, all of which are based in the Flemish region of Belgium. I
obtained contact information with leaders and members of organizations through internet
searches and official organization websites. I compiled a database of emails and provided study
information and an invitation to participate via email. Recruitment emails were provided in both
English and in the individual’s native language.3
If an individual expressed interest in participating, a follow up email was sent to schedule
a meeting at a time and public location of their choice. Over the course of two months, I
received a response from 35 individuals. 34 consented to participate in the interview process and
one refused. Individuals who participated in the interview were asked to pass on study
information and the researcher's contact information to other individuals who may be interested
in participating. This recruitment method is particularly useful when conducting a social
network analysis, as this provides insight into the ties between actors in the network. It is also
useful technique for reaching far-right activists, as these actors can be difficult to approach
directly (Goodwin 2010).
3.3.2

Informed Consent Process

At the meeting, the participant was read the informed consent script. All participants were fluent
in English, but a written script in the participant’s native language was provided to ensure the
participant clearly understood his or her rights. Participants were informed that their
3

Full text of the recruitment email is available in Appendix A. This email was also translated into Dutch and French
for native Dutch and French speakers.
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participation was voluntary, that the interview would take approximately one hour of their time,
and they were asked their preference about the confidentiality of the research materials,
specifically whether or not they wanted their name to be used in any research publications. The
participants were read the informed consent script and subsequently asked to provide oral
consent to participate.4 All participants provided oral consent to participate in the research.
They were provided with a copy of the informed consent form to keep in the event that they had
questions for me, Dr. Jelena Subotic, my dissertation supervisor, or the Georgia State University
Office for Human Research Protection about the study.
Potential interviewees were contacted via email and a follow-up phone call. Included in
the email was an invitation to participate. If a contact was willing to be interviewed,
arrangements were made for an appointment. Interviews were conducted at the interviewee's
workplace or an agreed upon public location. Upon arrival, I informed the participant about the
purpose of the research, his/her rights as a participant, and the risks and benefits associated with
participation. The principal investigator obtained oral informed consent from the participant
prior to the interview. In the event that the participant was not fluent in English, a copy of the
informed consent form was provided in the participant's native language (Dutch or French).
Once informed consent was obtained, I began the interview, which lasted approximately one
hour. The interview was based on a set of open-ended questions. A semi-structured interview
protocol was used during this study to ensure the interview would address the central research
question, while giving the respondent flexibility to expand on a given topic.5 This permitted new
questions to arise during the interview, enabled me to establish a rapport with the interviewee,
and ultimately generated greater insights (Flick 1995).
4

The full text of the Informed Consent script is available in Appendix B. The French and Dutch language versions of
the form are available in Appendix C and D respectively.
5
The full text of the semi-structured interview questions is available in Appendix F.
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3.3.3

Data Collection

I took shorthand notes during the interview with each participant. The notes were kept
confidential as provided by law. All of the research records were stored in locked cabinets and
password protected computer files. Identifiable data was only released if participants explicitly
give permission. Transcriptions of written notes were kept in password protected computer files.
Participants were informed that information would be shared with individuals who would make
sure the study is done correctly, including my supervisor, Dr. Jelena Subotic, the Institutional
Review Board, and the Office for Human Research Protection (OHRP) at Georgia State
University. All files containing identifiable information were destroyed within six months of the
initial data collection. To ensure that my research adheres to ethical standards, I completed
Georgia State University’s Educational Program on the Protection of Human Research Subjects.
This program includes a component on the ethics of field research. In addition, the project
received approval from Georgia State University’s Institutional Review Board.

3.3.4

Observations and Archival Research

I also attended public meetings and celebrations of nationalist organizations and conducted
observations (Fenno, 1990). These observations help paint a more holistic picture of the far-right
as it operates in a natural setting. This helped me to humanize or create a “peopled ethnography”
or the far-right network, based on my field notes, interviews, and the products created by group
members (Fine 2003). I did not attend these events as a participant observer, but rather an
“observer as participant,” whose primary role was to collect data. All events were public events
that I was invited to by party leaders and my identity as a researcher was known to all
participants (Alder and Alder 1994: 380). All events were held in public squares in the city of
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Antwerp or Belgium and did not pose a significant risk to my safety or the safety of participants
beyond that posed by day-to-day life. The purpose of these observations was to gain further
insight into the lived experience of those in the Flemish nationalist networks, and to conduct
observations about which organizations were in attendance at these events, in order to better
understand interogranizational relationships. These observations were focused and intended to
reinforce the data collected through more formal interviews.
In addition to observations, I also engaged in local archival research in order to better
understand the historical development of nationalist organizations, and collect data on
membership organization, funding, activities, and discourse through an analysis of movementgenerated documents.
3.4

Challenges
One of the challenges of this study is the issue of endogeneity. The central hypothesis is

that parties that occupy a central position within the broader network will be less vulnerable to
factionalism, better at mobilization, and ultimately more sustainable than parties that are isolated
relative to the broader network. However, it is unclear what comes first—party success or party
centrality. In other words, it is difficult to discern whether integration is a cause rather than a
manifestation of mobilization and sustainability. The primary means through which this concern
is addressed is through the qualitative interviews, which reveal the causal mechanisms that link
network position to party performance. George and Bennett have advocated process tracing as
means of “identifying the intervening casual process” and “causal mechanisms” that connect
hypothesized causes and outcomes (2005:206). One of the benefits of adopting a mixed method
approach is that the case studies will help reinforce the correlations found in the online network
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study and illuminate causal mechanisms that are difficult to capture in the absence of in-depth
qualitative analysis.
Conducting interviews with members of far-right parties and extremist organizations
poses a unique set of challenges, which helps explain why ethnographies have been underused in
this field of research. There are many barriers to access including “extremists’ mistrust of
scholars” and “scholars’ resistance to establishing ‘the rapport necessary for closeup studies of
those they regard as inexplicable or repugnant” (Barrett-Fox 2011: 14; Avanza 2008). Some of
these organizations are secretive, engaged in illegal activity, or socially stigmatized, which
would make members of these organizations reluctant to share information with scholars (Blee,
1999). However, as Mintz notes, “some of the best and most trying fieldwork has been done with
people with whose values their ethnographers were not in accord” (2000, p. 175; quoted in
Barrett-Fox, 2011: 14). Goodwin notes that, despite assumptions to the contrary, it was relatively
easy for him to gain access to far-right communities (Goodwin 2010: 34). It did prove difficult
to get participants from some of the most extreme actors in the community, specifically the
paramilitary organizations and members of the Walloon far-right. However, I did find that
members of the Flemish nationalist parties and student organizations were very willing to
participate in field interviews. While the interviews are not entirely representative, I feel
confident that they nevertheless provide valuable insights into the ways in which actors
experience the Belgian far-right network.
4
4.1

MAPPING THE FAR-RIGHT ONLINE

The Online Network of the Belgian Far-Right

Belgium is an ideal case to study causal mechanisms of far-right success as it has two far-right
parties operating within the same national context. One party, the Vlaams Belang, has become
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one of the most successful far-right parties in Europe while the other, the FN, has never been
able to gain electoral momentum. Conventional explanations of far-right success do not
explain the trajectory of the far-right parties in Belgium. Explanations linked to the level of
immigration would predict that Wallonia’s FN would be more successful as it has a higher
level of immigration than the home turf of the VB, Flanders. Explanations linked to
unemployment would also predict more success for the far-right in Wallonia, which has a
higher unemployment rate than Flanders (Art 2008: 425-426). The FN has a had a strong antiimmigrant ideology since the 1970s when its rallying cry was to send “parasitic foreigners”
home in order to ensure “work for Belgians and Europeans” (Delwit 2007: 145). One might
think that, in the face of high unemployment, Walloons would be more likely to use the
immigrant community as a scapegoat, and find the anti-immigrant rhetoric of the FN
compelling. Yet the ideological appeal of the FN in Wallonia has been limited and it has
almost always been perceived as a pariah.
To understand why the Flanders-based VB has been the more successful, it is
necessary to look beyond socioeconomic explanations and examine the organizational
foundations of the party. The evidence from the Belgian case suggests that the most successful
far-right parties are those with network power. Network power is defined by the centrality of
the party within the broader network. Highly successful parties have high indegree centrality,
meaning that a large number of other actors in the network are linked to them. These linkages
enable a party to communicate with other actors in the network, distribute policy information,
recruit members, and garner electoral support.
The Vlaams Belang is one of the most successful parties in Europe. In its eight- year
lifespan, it has achieved representation in the legislature seven times (sustainability: .875). It is
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apparent that a number of organizations are clustered around the Vlaams Belang. One can see
that the VB (depicted in yellow on the network map below) is bonded, or densely connected,
to a group of actors (Burt 2005). This clustering is referred to as bonding, a tightly knit, highly
connected subgroup. (Hoppe and Reinelt 2010: 601). These dense connections are an
indication of a sense of trusted community where interactions are frequent and efficient
(Hoppe and Reinelt 2010: 602).

Figure 4.1 Bonding with the Vlaams Belang

The network map provides additional evidence to support the claim that the VB is closely
linked to other Flemish nationalist organizations: including Voorpost, Volksunie, and the
Nationalistische Studentenvereniging (Nationalist Student Organization, NSV).
The trusted community in which the Vlaams Belang is situated is the Flemish
nationalist movement. The party can trace its origins back to the Vlaams Nationaal Verboond
(VNV), a Flemish nationalist organization that collaborated with Nazi Germany during the
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Second World War. Following the war, the VNV was banned, but because it was an aggregate
of several preexisting Flemish nationalist organizations, it continued to exist in the form of
secret societies. This included the Vlaamse Concentratie (Flemish Concentration, VC), the
paramilitary organization Vlaamse Militanten Orde (Flemish Military Order, VMO), Were Di,
and the paramilitary organization Voorpost. The Flemish nationalist party Volksunie (People’s
Union, VU), born in 1954, was able to draw upon the organizations for members and support.
Art’s interview with an activist within the Flemish nationalist movement illustrates the
interdependency of organizations with the network:

My grandfather was with the VNV. He was a teacher and pro-Flemish....After the war, my grandfather
spent several years in prison....My grandmother also did some time. So more or less grew up in the
Flemish Movement....When I was 6, 1 became a member of the VNJ. It's an ideological youth movement,
and many children of Flemish nationalists are members. You are given certain values and a particular
vision: the pan-Dutch and right-wing view in general. When I was 16, I joined the VNJ leaders' corps....At
a certain point, X asked me to become a member of Voorpost. I agreed, because ideologically I backed
Voorpost, and because I had already participated before....It's assumed that someone from my background
knows what Voorpost is about. In fact, not much has changed....I recently became a member of the
Vlaams Blok.

Many members of the Vlaams Belang came out of the Volksunie or several other
Flemish nationalist organizations Verbond van Nederlandse Werkgemeenschappen Were Di
(Association of Dutch Working Groups Protect Yourself, Were Di) and the Vlaamse
Militanten Orde (Order of Flemish Militants, VMO) (Art 2008: 428). The Vlaams Belang also
has ties with the Nationalist Student Organization (NSV), which acts as a feeder for its
members. By building on this organizational foundation and focusing on party building at the
local level, the VB was able to become one of the most durable and electorally successful farright parties in Europe.
In contrast to the network centrality of the VB, the network map reveals that the FN is
in a relatively isolated position with limited network power. The map reveals that the FN is on
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the outskirts of the organizational network and that it is not bridged or densely bonded with
other actors in the network. The Vlaams Belang is densely connected to many other
nationalist organizations; however the FN is located in Wallonia, a region without a strong
nationalist subculture, and this is reflected in its scarcity of linkages to other actors on the
network map. While the VB occupies a position at the center of a densely connected the
cluster, the FN is relatively marginalized. In contrast to the VB, which shares linkages with 50
other sites, the FN only has ties with seven other organizations in the network. This means
that only seven sites in the broader network link to the website of the FN. This relatively
isolated position limits the power of the party within the broader network, affecting its ability to
communicate with other organizations, recruit members, and mobilize an effective campaign.
While the party has proved to be fairly durable with a lifespan of 27 years, it has never
achieved representation in the legislature (sustainability: 0). Its vote share in the most recent
election was only .1 percent.
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Figure 4.2 The Relative Isolation of the National Front

In order to understand why the FN has always been on the fringe, one must
examine the history of far-right nationalism in Wallonia. The origins of the far-right in
French- speaking Belgium date back to the 1930s, when Catholic dissidents formed the
anti- Communist Rexist Party. The Rexists advocated corporatism and Catholicism and
criticized governmental and societal corruption. Their perspective on societal
corruption was informed by anti-Semitism and, in 1936, the party underwent a process
of fasciziation and collaboration with Nazi Germany. This process of fasciziation is
similar to the one the Flemish Vlaams Nationaal Verboond (VNV) experienced in the
1930s and 40s; however the postwar experience of the two differed dramatically. Like
the VNV, the Rexist party was banned, however the Rexists were unable to maintain a
presence in Wallonia, even in the form of secret societies.
The Rexists of the Walloon far-right were not situated within a larger nationalist
movement and the ban resulted in the disappearance of the French far-right from the
political scene from the postwar era up until the 1970s. Thus, when the BNF was
formed in the 1980s, it had no preexisting foundation on which to build and no network
of organizations to recruit members from. As a consequence, the BNF has always been
“evanescent from an organizational point of view” (DeWitt: 148). The party has been
plagued by infighting and factionalism and frequently will splinter into smaller
movements. The likelihood of the BNF establishing a more central position within the
far-right network in the future is slim. In March 2015, the party’s namesake, the French
Front Nationale, dissociated itself from the party, asserting that the Belgian NF was no
longer allowed to use its name or logo. Thus, a party lacking in ties with domestic far-
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right organizations was also robbed of its international ties to one of the strongest farright parties in Europe, making it difficult for the party to market itself and attract new
members.
4.1.1

Changes in the Network Structure

A network map from 2016 reveals change over time in the network structure, most notably a
change in network size and an increase in the number of incoming links to the website of the
Vlaams Belang. The first noticeable change is an increase in the size of the network overall.
The same far-right seed sites were entered in to both the map from 2012 and the map of 2016;
however there are nearly 200 more organization sites that appeared in the crawl of the 2016
network.
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Figure 4.3 The Belgian Far Right Network 2016

The increase in overall size may be a reflection of the upsurge in popularity of far-right websites
in the aftermath of the Paris and Belgian terrorist attacks. In addition, the Vlaams Belang’s
indegree centrality has increased from 50 to 185, meaning there are incoming links from 185
other actors in the network. This makes the Vlaams Belang the most central actor in the
network; however the site of N-VA has nearly the same indegree centrality (181). The fact that
both of these actors are equally central within the network suggests that the two are in
competition for the central position within the network.
4.2

The Cross-Fertilization of the Flemish Far-Right

In addition to the database of organizational websites, I constructed a database of Twitter
followers of Belgian far-right organizations. Whether following an organization on Twitter
translates into a vote at the polls is subject to debate, however several studies have indicated
that social media does impact political behavior and that is frequently used by activist
organizations to mobilize and proselytize (Elinas 2009, Phillips 2010, Barlett and Littler
2011).
The data is limited to the four organizations with active Twitter accounts: the Vlaams
Belang (VB), Front Nationale (FN), Voorpost (VP), and the Nationalistische
Studentenvereniging (NSV), a Flemish nationalist student movement that has chapters
throughout Flanders. Unfortunately, many of the most extreme organizations are highly
secretive and do not use Twitter as a mechanism of online communication. However, the
existing dataset does incorporate five of the most significant organizations in Belgium. I
constructed the following alliance matrix, which illustrates the overlapping followers for each
pair of organizations in the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994). This graph provides
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normalized data on the overlapping memberships within the network, revealing patterns of
interconnectivity.
The first notable observation is there is a significant overlap in membership between the NSV
and the Vlaams Belang. 298 followers of the NSV (or 66%) also follow the Vlaams Belang.
While the nature of the relationship between the NSV and other far-right organizations has
been subject to debate, the data does seem to support the assertion that the NSV is closely
linked to the VB. . In the words of one outspoken student critic of the NSV it is the “crossfertilization” of NSV and other far-right organizations that boosts far-right organizational
membership, with each organization “fishing within the same pool of Flemish radicals”
(Peeters 2010). It is interesting to note that key officials in the VB follow the NSV on Twitter
including Philip Dewinter (who joined NSV as a student in 1982), Bart Laeremans, and Bert
Schoofs.
Table 4.1 Density Matrix of Twitter Followers

FN

FN

NSV

VB

VP

N-VA

58 (1)

2 (.03)

10 (.17)

2 (.03)

10 (.17)

448 (1)

298 (.66)

249 (.55) 194 (.43)

7454 (1)

449 (.06) 3376 (.45)

NSV 2(0)
VB

10 (0)

298 (.03)

VP

2 (0)

249 (.30) 449(.54)

835 (1)

NVA

10 (0)

194 (.01)

227 (.01) 33,210 (1)

3376
(.10)

227
(.27%)

The overlapping followers of the NSV and Voorpost is another significant trend.
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Voorpost is one of the more extreme Flemish nationalist organizations, which broke away
from the more moderate Volksunie following a period of radicalization in the 1970s. 249 or
55% of NSV followers also follow Voorpost. This lends support to the assertion that the NSV
and Voorpost have overlapping memberships in the real world and frequently attend one
another’s events. One student observer notes that members of Voorpost often attend NSV
events as “stewards” or security officials at NSV events. Voorpost is typically characterized
as militant organization and its members frequently participate in street movements, protesting
the monarchy and immigration.
Voorpost has more overlapping followers with the Vlaams Belang than it does with
the N-VA, which suggests that Voorpost has denser ties with Vlaams Belang than it does with
the N-VA. 449 or 59% of Voorpost followers also follow the Vlaams Belang compared to
249 or 30% who follow the N-VA. Qualitative studies of the far-right in Belgium suggest that
it is not unusual for a person to belong to both Vlaams Belang and Voorpost or to transition
from one to the other. For example, Jan, a Vlaams Belang activist, states that he became part of
the Flemish nationalist movement in the 1970s, protesting against the university system’s shift
to the left. He joined VMO and later Voorpost, which he said naturally led him to support
Vlaams Belang when it was established (Klingerman’s and Mayer 2013). In addition a leading
Vlaams Belang politician, Luc Vermeulen, was also an action leader in Voorpost up until
June 2013 when he named a successor, but indicated that he was not “saying goodbye” and
would remain active in the organization (Verreycken 2013).
In contrast to the high density of overlapping memberships between the Flemish
nationalist organizations, the FN is relatively isolated. It has a total of 24 overlapping
memberships, including 10 with Vlaams Belang and 10 with N-VA. It is not at all shocking to
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find that a Wallonia-based party does not have a high degree of overlapping supporters with
Flemish-based movements. However, there are very few French far-right organizations in
Belgium to begin with. The organizations that do exist (e.g. Les Villains) are not officially
represented on Twitter. Thus, the ability of the FN to link up with other Belgian far-right
organizations via social media is extremely limited.
While one should be cautious about assuming there is a direct link between online and
offline political behavior, the alliance matrix of Twitter followers suggest that there are dense
connections between the followers of Flemish nationalist organizations. The organizations use
Twitter to post news stories, promote policy preferences, and advertise upcoming events. This
has the potential to diffuse policy preferences throughout the network and facilitate the
recruitment of new members. While overlapping memberships can indicate dense ties between
organizations that could be beneficial to a party as it seeks to mobilize and recruit, an overlap
in membership of two parties within the same network is not beneficial. Unless the parties are
intentionally cooperating with one another to form a coalition, parties are inherently
competitors of one another. Therefore, an overlap in party followers suggests that the
organizations have followers with dual loyalties, which could impact a party’s performance at
the polls.
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Figure 4.4 The Overlapping Twitter Followers of VB and the N-VA6
An analysis of the Twitter followers of the N-VA and the Vlaams Belang reveals that there is
a significant niche overlap of the two organizations; however the overlap is asymmetrical and
is more detrimental to the Vlaams Belang than to N-VA. The total number of overlapping
members is 3,182 or 8.9% of the combined total followers. This data supports the claim that
the N-VA, the newer of the two parties, has been able to capture the support of some VB
supporters. The data suggests that there is an asymmetry in the overlap that gives the N-VA a
competitive advantage over the Vlaams Belang. The N-VA has 25,385 followers or roughly
89% of followers that do not overlap with VB. In contrast, the Vlaams Belang has only 624 or
roughly 16% of followers that do not overlap with N-VA. This suggests that the N-VA has a
competitive advantage over the Vlaams Belang.

6

Graphic created using Followerwonk. MOZ (2016). Followerwonk is a tool for Twitter analytics that is
predominantly used by businesses to track their followers and increase their social media power. It generates
comparisons of the followers of Twitter users.
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4.3

Mapping the Ideology of the Belgian Far-Right

This portion of the study seeks to identify contemporary discursive trends in the far-right
network and to assess whether parties which use discourse that is more dominant within the
network fare better than those who use a discourse that is less prevalent. Far-right scholars
have often studied the ideology of the far-right in comparison with that of the center right.
However, scholars are beginning to recognize the importance of examining how discourse is
used by far-right parties to connect or disassociate with internal competitors (Harrison and
Bruter 2011). The discourse analysis portion of this involves an exploration of discursive
patterns in the network as a whole and compares it to the discourse used by individual actors.
The goal is to determine the degree of ideological fit between the network and a party within
it in order to identity which parties occupy a position in the ideological center and which
parties are on the ideological fringe. I expect that parties at the ideological center of the
network will be more sustainable than parties on the ideological fringe.
4.3.1

Historical Trends in Belgian Far-Right Discourse

In the 1930s, the dominant ideology within the Flemish nationalist network was an antiEnlightenment posture and, by the end of the 1930s, a fascist form of Flemish nationalism was
dominant (Sternhell 2010). Fascist Flemish nationalist groups who cooperated with Germany
during WWII were delegitimized once the war was over; however Flemish independence
remained on the agenda and many of the more radical elements in the Flemish movement
remained active underground. The Volksunie was established in 1954 and advocated for
Flemish independence. The discourse of Flemish nationalism radicalized again in the 1970s,
when the radical wing of this organization split in the 1970s to form the Vlaams Blok
(People’s Union). The Vlaams Blok, like its contemporary the National Front in France,
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ushered in a resurgence of neofascist rhetoric, and was ultimately found to be in violation of
Belgian laws prohibiting xenophobia. The successor of the Vlaams Blok, the Vlaams Belang,
continued its legacy of using explicitly xenophobic and Islamophobic rhetoric; however, in
more recent years, the party has moderated its discourse. In addition, the new Flemish
nationalist party, the N-VA, while it advocates for Flemish separatism, is trying to market
itself as moderate nationalist party that does not use racialized language.
In contrast to radical Flemish nationalists, who want to separate from Belgium and, the
Walloon far-right tends to be in favor of maintaining Belgian unity, in part because they
believe that the Flemish will pursue a more restrictive immigration policy. The factor that
tends to unify the Walloon far-right with the Flemish far-right is its authoritarianism and its
use of xenophobic rhetoric. For example, a study conducted by Swyngedouw and Ivaldi
(2001) found that both the Vlaams Belang and the FN espoused an anti-democratic and
ethnocentric ideology.
4.3.2

Contemporary Trends in the Network

In order to identify contemporary discursive trends in the Belgian far-right network, I
conducted an analysis of meta-keywords for each party and in the network as a whole. The
first notable observation is that the Vlaams Belang is more likely to use xenophobic discourse
than the FN. Specifically, the Vlaams Belang is nearly five times as likely to reference
“immigrants,” “migration,” “strangers,” and “criminality” than the FN. For example, on the
homepage of the VB, they note that “immigrants are difficult to integrate.” They also note that
“foreigners are overrepresented in crime.” The overall tendency is to equate foreigners as the
other and to hold them culpable for societal problems. This finding is consistent with Harrison
and Bruter’s study of Belgium’s far-right ideology, which also finds that the discourse of the

60

VB is more xenophobic than the FN (2011: 105). The Vlaams Belang is also more xenophobic
than the Belgian far-right network on the whole. This may help us understand why the once
successful Vlaams Belang has become vulnerable to a less overtly xenophobic party, the NVA.
The broader network is characterized predominantly by preservationist nationalism.
The word nationalism is the most frequently occurring meta-keyword in the Belgian far-right
(frequency 56). Examining these meta-keywords in context reveals that the majority of the
references to nationalism refer to the goal of preserving the Flemish nation.
Example A: Nationalism is the most natural, most harmonious organization anywhere in
the world…Survival and self-defense are legitimate urges. Self-determination is
essential for Flanders and for individuals.
Example B: The Nationalist Student Union emerged in the 1970s, a time when tradition
Flemish nationalism was petering out in the universities. Our mission then was to
propagate nationalism in a principled and radical way-and that’s basically still our
mission.

Table 4.2 Meta Keywords Used by Belgian Far-Right
___________________________________________________________
Network
Nationalism, Dutch, Cordon, Stranger, Independence, Youth, Free, Islamization
FN
Important, Our, Communal, Laws, Belgium, False, Articles, Islam, Adhere,
Sharia, Cordon Sanitaire, Left, Immigration, Liberty, Tribune, Free, Releases,
More, Manipulation, Masses, Presentation, Europeans
VB
Belang, Blok, Flemish, Action, Immigrants, Annemans, Boss, Belgium, First,
Reports, Boycott, Cordon, Criminal, Strangers, Dewinter, Own People,
Ethnicity, Europe, European, Filip, Gerolf, History, Tough, Identity, Youth,
Communication, Opinion, Migrant, Migration, Nationalist, New Party,
Independent
NVA
Flemish, Safety, Brussels, March, Budget, Trade Policy, Invest, Flanders,
Mobility, Document, Minister, Justice, Home, Work, Government, Policy
The three major parties all depart in some way from the broader discursive trends in the
network and none of the parties alone seems to be a perfect ideological match. However, the
data suggests that parties that use a preservationist nationalist rhetoric are a better match than
those who use overtly racist or Islamophobic rhetoric.
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Table 4.3 Meta-Keywords in the Belgian Far Right Network
Xenophobia

Biologica
l Racism

AntiIslam

Populism

Preservation

Entire
Network

1

0

1

0

3

FN

1

0

2

1

2

VB

5

3

0

1

2

NVA

0

0

0

0

2

On the whole, the VB tends to be more xenophobic, biologically racist, and populist than the
broader far-right network. While the FN and the broader network both incorporate
Islamophobic discourse, the FN has two keywords that relate to Islamophobia (sharia and
Islam), relative to one keyword (Islamization) in the broader network, suggesting that the FN
places even more of an emphasis on combating Islam. While both the FN and the broader
network using preservationist nationalist rhetoric, the dominant pattern in the broader network
is Flemish preservationism, whereas the FN focuses on preserving Belgium and preserving
Europe:
Example A: No to the Islamization of Belgium and Europe
Example B: The European race is almost to the point of ethnocide.
The N-VA is less xenophobic and Islamophobic than the other parties and the broader
network, with no meta-keywords that explicitly refer to foreigners, immigrants, or Islam.
While it is not a perfect ideological match, its absence of racist rhetoric does appear to make it
closer to the ideological center in the network than the other parties. The NVA is notable for
the absence of xenophobic and Islamophobic discourse on the homepage, with no metakeywords that relate directly to immigrants, foreigners, or Islam. This is to be expected as the
party has intentionally marketed itself as a nonracist alternative to the Vlaams Belang. The
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feature it shares with the broader network is its emphasis on preservationism. For example, it
focuses on the necessity of people speaking Dutch in order to “preserve the character of Dutch
Flanders” and to “restore the Dutch language character of the Vlaamse Rand.” Similarly, it
supports more autonomy from Wallonia and a confederation so that the Flemish can focus on
“their own problems, with their own money…to make Flanders better.” It suggests that the
present system, coexistence with Wallonia, is weak and that “immobilism is threatening the
prosperity of the entire population,” therefore, separatism is necessary to maintain a “strong
Flanders in a strong Europe.” This emphasis on the necessity of Flemish nationalism,
separatism, and protecting Dutch culture is a dominant theme within the broader network.
Nearly all of the far-right organizations in Belgium, with the exception of those in Wallonia,
advocate Flemish nationalism.
The concept map of Belgium reveals that it is not ideologically centralized; rather there
are several conceptual hubs within the network. Concept maps are a way to visualize the
connections between concepts. The concept maps suggest that nationalism is the dominant
concept within the network.
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Figure 4.5 Concept Map of the Belgian Far-Right Network7

An examination of the conceptual map of the Belgian far-right network suggests that the most
frequently used meta-keyword in the Belgian far-right network is nationalism, which appears
on 56 of the homepages of the organizational websites. Nationalism is also the meta-keyword
that co-occurs most often with the other conceptual hubs in the network (cordon,
free/youth/stranger/Dutch, and Islamization). This suggests the ideological center of the
Belgian far-right network is Flemish nationalism. This involves a combination of
preservationist and xenophobic rhetoric. Islamophobia is prevalent within the network, but
occurs with less frequency, suggesting that overtly Islamophobic rhetoric is more on the
ideological fringe relative to Flemish nationalism, which is the ideological core.

7

The concept map was created using VOSON Textual Analysis Software. The graph was modified from its original
version and translated into English.
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It is difficult to draw concrete conclusions about the relationship between a party’s
ideological centrality and its sustainability based on this data; however the findings do suggest
the preservationist Flemish nationalism is the dominant discourse in the Belgium far-right
network and that explicitly xenophobic and Islamophobic rhetoric does appear, but not as
frequently. Therefore, in order to be ideologically central within a network, a far-right party
would need to advocate for Flemish nationalism. Parties that use overtly xenophobic and
Islamophobic rhetoric may be closer to the ideological fringe of the Belgian far-right network.
One avenue for future research is to explore whether the impact of a party’s ideological
fit within a network is dependent upon the ideological structure of the network itself. It is
possible that a party’s ideological centrality is only an asset in a highly centralized network,
but provides no advantage in a decentralized network. In addition, it would be helpful to
construct a corpus that is representative of the entirety of the Belgian far-right’s discourse and
compare network trends to individual party trends in order to further substantiate the findings
in this study.
4.4

A Corpus-Based Analysis of Belgian Far-Right Discourse

In addition to the text analysis provided by the VOSON system, I also created an original
corpus of text for each party. Each corpus has at least one million words and contains a variety
of genres of text including online forums, party manifestos, news publications, and Facebook
and Twitter feeds. The advantage of the corpus analysis is that one can calculate relative
frequencies of words per 1,000 words. This permits comparisons in the relative rate of
occurrence of a word across cases. Using Wordsmith, a word-list was produced for each
corpus which listed the words in order of frequency and displayed the frequency of each word

65

relative to the total number of words.8
Table 4.4 Relative Word Frequencies9
FN

Vlaams Belang

We
.42
Country

Flemish

Our
Again
Politics

8

.24 Yet
.40
.18 Our
.23
.15 European

NVA

.45 Must

.18

.45

Can

.32

Justice

.27

Year

.23

Minister

.18

world

.15 Must
.17
.13 year

.17

All

Belgian

.13

Europe

.17

Himself

.17

Muslims

.13

land

.15

Belgium

.17

against

.12

Euro

.15

One

.17

.18

Women

.12 Party

.15 Us

.17

society

.11 Flanders

.14 Flemish

.16

Europe

.11 Belgium

.13 Today

.16

Others

.11 Brussels

.13 European

.16

European

.10

Other

.12 Flanders

.15

Women

.10

Politics

.11 Euro

.14

For more information on the use of wordlists in discourse analysis see Alessia Cogo and Martin Dewey’s Analysing
English as a Lingua Franca: A Corpus-Driven Investigation. London: Continuum: 2012.
9
Relative word frequencies list were generated using Wordsmith and are given as a percentage per 1,000 words.
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Life

.10

Islam

.10

Children

.09

Liberty

.09

Europe

.09

Society

.09

New
.11

New
.14

Government

.10 Brussels

.14

Today

.10 Shall
.13

Shall

.10 Government .13

State

.09 Other

.12

Islam

.09 Policy

.11

4.4.1 Islamophobic Discourse of the FN
The word frequencies suggest that the FN is the most explicitly Islamophobic party, placing it on
the ideological fringe relative to the dominant theme of preservationist Flemish nationalism in
the broader community. The FN is more likely to explicitly reference Muslims (freq. 13%) and
Islam (freq. 10%) than the VB (freq. 9%) or the NVA (freq. 0%)10 Islamophobia appears to be a
critical component of the FN’s discourse. An examination of the context in which Muslims are
referred to by the FN reveals the following patterns. The first is a tendency to refer to the
growing number of Muslims in the country. There are multiple references to the growing
number of Muslims in Belgium and the concern that they are becoming the new majority to the
detriment of the European population. For example, there is a statement that “Europe will be a
Muslim continent within a few decades.” Similarly, there are projections that “half of the
population in the Netherlands will be Muslim” and that “in France, a French family has 1.8
10

Frequencies are given as a percentage per 1,000 words.
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children and Muslims have 8.1 children.” These statements involve an “othering” of the Muslim
community and an effort to draw a boundary to exclude Muslims from national identities. By
creating a false dichotomy of French versus Muslim, the party is suggesting that it is not possible
to be both French and Muslim, thereby perpetuating their belief in exclusive definitions of
national identities (Eastmond 1998).
In addition to the demographic concern, the FN is also concerned with the spread of
Islamic fundamentalism in Europe. They assert that Muslims see the world as “divided in two:
Muslims and non-Muslims and non-Muslims are the target.” They repeatedly express the
concern that the ultimate goal of Muslim immigrants in Europe is the “ethnocide” of the nonMuslim population. Specifically, there is concern that the Islamists will oppress “atheist
minorities,” as well as “Christians and Jews.”
Another salient theme is the FN’s perception that Islam is degrading towards women and
that the diffusion of Islam will lead to an increase in sexual violence against women. The
perception is that the Koran justifies the oppression of women and the existence of slavery,
frequently linking the two together. For example one account notes that, if Muslims are involved
in a war, “women and children POWs will be taken as slaves.” Even the absence of references to
war, “women” and “slave/hostage” frequently appear together. For example there are references
to “veiled women” as “hostages” who will be “stoned to death” if they commit adultery against
their husbands. Thus, non-Muslim women are depicted as at risk of being taken hostage and
Muslim women are already hostage within the oppressive Islamic system. There is also a
concern that the oppression of women will lead to sexual violence against women. There are
three references to the fact that “85% of rapists in Sweden are Muslim” and one account of how
“Swedish women are afraid to go out at night,” for fear of being raped by Muslim

68

immigrants. Similarly, another news story asserts,” 47% of women in rural areas of Turkey have
experienced physical or sexual violence,” and links this to the fact that the “Koran allows
domestic violence.” The repetitive associations between Islam and criminality and violence
towards women suggest that the FN is an explicitly Islamophobic party.
4.4.2

The Xenophobic Discourse of the Vlaams Belang

While the FN is the most likely to use Islamophobic rhetoric, the Vlaams Belang is more
likely to be self-referential (“Flemish,” “Europe,” or “European”). The rhetoric of the
Vlaams Belang focuses on the threat immigrants pose to the Flemish national identity. While
the Vlaams Belang does use Islamophobic rhetoric, it also frequently mentions the threat of
immigrant without making specific reference to Muslim immigration, making its rhetoric
more dominantly xenophobic than Islamophobic. For example, party leader Tom Van
Grieken remarked: “More immigration-less Flanders.” Similarly, they state that “Flanders is
flooded with more and more immigrants.” Like the FN, the Vlaams Belang emphasizes the
demographic shift taking place in Flanders and perceives it as threatening, but it does not
always specifically identity the threat as Muslim. In addition, as a Flemish nationalist party,
many of the references are to Flanders being threatened not only by immigration, but also by
the lack of an independent Flanders. Many of the references to “Flemings” emphasize the
necessity of establishing an independent state. For example, they note, “Vlaams Belang
believes that not only Scots, Basques and Catalans, but the Flemings deserve an independent
state. It is time that Flanders follow the Catalan example.”
In addition to the desire to preserve Flemish identity, the Vlaams Belang makes
repeated reference to the necessity of preserving European identity. For example, they do not
favor the integration of Turkey into the EU, saying “We as Vlaams Belang know that Turkey is
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not a European country.” Similarly they suggest that in order for Europe and immigration to
coexist, “Immigrants needs to adjust to our European way of life.” This statement implies that
multiculturalism is not desirable and that the behaviors of immigrants must be controlled in order
to preserve the status quo. It is notable that the Vlaams Belang, a Flemish nationalist party
references not only Flemish identity, but European identity. Buonfino finds that a similar shift
in the “size of the community of belonging” from the national to the European level is apparent
in the discourse surrounding immigration in Europe more broadly (2004: 42). He suggests that
“through cultural and political discourse, the European Member States have seen a reaffirmation
of we-identity by sustaining a politics of belonging aimed at the exclusion of the Other (the nonEuropean or “third country national”) (Buonfino 2004: 42). Like the FN, the discourse of the
Vlaams Belang suggest that immigrants pose a threat to the national and European identity;
however the Vlaams Belang is less likely to explicitly identify the threat as Muslim. Thus the
data does not suggest that one party is a better ideological match with the broader network than
the other.
4.4.3

The Moderate Nationalism of the N-VA

While the N-VA does advocate for Flemish nationalism, it is the least Islamophobic of the three
parties and does not explicitly link migration with Islamization. This finding supports the claim
that the N-VA is a more ideologically central party in the network relative to those, like the FN,
that use overt forms of Islamophobic rhetoric that are more peripheral in the network. The word
Muslim is only used twice in the entire corpus and never in an Islamophobic way. For example,
in its statements on migration policy, the NVA notes that “It is tragic that to many migration
automatically evokes notions of poverty, abuse of social security, housing problems, and even
criminality and Muslim extremism.” In stark contrast to the accounts of the FN which discuss
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the flood of Muslim immigration to the country and the threat this poses to national identity, the
NVA point out that “less than 1 in 8 migrants comes from a Muslim country.” It appears that
rather than trying to fan the flames of Islamophobia, the NVA is trying to create a more positive
discourse around the issue of immigration. When the NVA does discuss migration, which it
does with .06% frequency, it does not tend to categorize migrants by their religion or ethnicity,
rather the NVA refers to migrants in a generic sense. There is a tendency to discuss migration
from an economic standpoint. Seven of the references to migration are about migrant workers.
Once again, there is a tendency to deescalate tension around the immigration issue. For example,
they state, “growth of underprivileged migrants is not so great that the labor market cannot keep
pace. Unlike the VB and the FN, the NVA does not explicitly assert that immigrants and Islam
pose a threat to the cultural and economic security of the nation.
4.4.4

Comparative Keyword Analysis: N-VA and Vlaams Belang

The word frequency lists provide information about word frequencies; however in order to
best compare the corpora of far-right discourse, it is also useful to conduct a keyword
analysis, which involves examining a corpus and identifying words that appear with unusual
frequency in comparison to the reference corpus. This permits the creation of a list of
keywords or words that occur more frequently than would be expected by chance alone (Scott
and Tribble 1996, Baker and Ellece 2011). Because the FN corpus is a French language
corpus, I am unable to compare it to the Flemish nationalist corpora; however it is possible to
compare the corpus of the NVA and the VB and identify similarities and differences in their
discourse.
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Table 4.5 Keywords in the N-VA Corpus
KEYWORD
FREQUENCY
%
VB
NVA
Corpus
Frequency
Justice
275
.27
48

VB %

Keyness

P

.04%

210.99

0.0000

Must

459

.45

202

.17

143.48

0.00000

Accompaniment

85

.08

0

0

130.65

0.000

We

599

.58

353

.30

105.11

0.0000

Prisons

103

.10

13

.01

93.12

0.00000

Court

103

.09

13

.01

76.43

0.0000

Workload

44

.04

0

0

67.63

0.0000

measurement
Magistrates

53

.05

2

0

66.77

0.0000

Can

332

.31

177

.15

66.48

0.0000

Punishment

87

.08

16

.01

64.70

0.0000

Appeal

59

.06

5

61.82

0.0000

Unity Court

39

.04

0

0

59.94

0.0000

Perpetrator

65

.06

8

0

59.41

0.00000

Policy

117

.11

36

.03

57.74

0.0000

Must

335

.33

199

.17

57.63

0.0000

Education

43

.04

1

3

47.65

0.00000

Migration

60

0.06

1

10

47.27

0.00000

Courts

45

.04

1

4

46.44

0.0000

Internees

28

.03

1

0

43.04

0.00000

Punishment

27

.03

1

0

41.50

0.00000

72

Jail

72

.07

20

.02

39.25

0.0000

One of the most prominent patterns in the NVA Corpus is the party’s use of terms related to
the maintenance of law and order. Nine of the first twenty keywords are related to law and
order including prisons, courts, punishment, and perpetrator. The majority (roughly 80%) of
the references to punishment focus on recommendations for improving the criminal justice
system through electronic monitoring systems for perpetrators, and better community service
programs. Much of the emphasis is placed on the necessity of timely punishment. For
example, they argue, “unless the punishment is immediate, it will have no effect.” Similarly,
the references to perpetrators emphasize the need for speed and the necessity of tailoring the
punishment to fit the perpetrator. It is noticeable that among the N-VA’s frequent mention of
perpetrators there are no explicit linkages made between immigrants and crime.
Example A: Perpetrators of crimes are often only penalized after many years.
Example B: A judge does not know the criminal history of a perpetrator because, for
example, a conviction of a half year earlier is not yet in the registry.
Example C: Sometimes it is better for the perpetrator of a crime to be immediately
punished with a house arrest rather than imprisonment.
While both parties are concerned with crime, the N-VA places more emphasis on the
strengthening the institutions and procedures that achieve justice and is roughly ten times
more likely to mention prisons and nine times more likely to mention courts than the Vlaams
Belang.
Table 4.6 Keywords of the Vlaams Belang
KEYWORD
FREQUENCY
%
NVA
VB
Corpus
Frequency
Islam

108

.09

1

NVA

Keyness

P Value

320.59

0.0000

%
0

73

Muslims

459

.45

202

.17

143.43

0.00000

Party

173

.15

28

0.03

96.33

0.000

Obama

73

.06

3

0

90.97

0.00000

Women

106

.09

8

0

86.45

0.0000

Islamic

67

.06

0

0

83.49

0.0000

EU

236

.20

64

.06

81.45

0.0000

Against

270

.24

94

.09

71.01

0.0000

Immigrant

80

.07

5

0

69.34

0.0000

Media

71

.06

5

0

59.28

0.0000

Violence

87

.07

11

.01

56.49

0.000

June

70

.06

6

0

54.57

0.0000

Immigration

73

.06

7

0

54.25

0.0000

Journalist

43

.04

7

0

53.58

0.0000

Dutch

80

.07

10

0

52.57

0.0000

Multicultural

41

.03

1

0

51.09

0.0000

Immigrants

50

.04

3

0

48.06

0.0000

Men

41

.03

1

0

43.18

0.00000

Free

57

.05

5

0

39.66

0.00000

Voters

41

.03

2

0

37.99

0.0000

Islamization

23

.02

1

0

28.66

0.0000

The Vlaams Belang is much more likely than the NVA to explicitly reference Islam.
Four of the top 20 keywords in the network relate directly to Islam-Islam, Muslim, Islamic, and
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Islamization. Islam is the most significant keyword in the VB corpus, with a frequency of .09%
relative to 0% for the NVA. Of the 459 uses of the word Muslims in the corpus, 10% are paired
with the word extremism or fundamentalism. As a point of comparison, a study of the use of
the word Muslim in the British press revealed that the word Muslim was paired with an
extremist word (fanatic or militant) only 5% or 1 in 20 times (Baker et al. 2013: 8).
Example A:
Example B:
Example C:
Example D:

There is a bizarre monstrous alliance between communism and Muslim
extremism.
The eternal excuse culture of the left is the only real racism, giving Muslim
extremists wings.
In early August, the state reported that there are many Belgian Muslims among
the Muslim extremists in the free Syrian Army.”
There is no place for Muslim extremists in the Scheldt City or anywhere in
Flanders.

Another pattern in the discourse of the Vlaams Belang is the appearance of Muslim and women
together, in seven instances as one word moslimvrouwen (Muslim women). 45% of the times
that the word women is used, it is in the same sentence as Muslim, Islam, or Islamic
Fundamentalism. There is a tendency to portray Islam as a threat to the rights of women with a
focus on whether or not women should wear the veil.
Example A: Are we living in Belgium? The proselytism of Muslim converts is striking.
All Muslim women continue to believe in the hijab.
Example B: If a Muslim woman cannot get a job because she chooses to dress according
to the code of Islam or submits voluntarily to the crazy demands of Muslim men that is
her own choice.
Example C: No to the compulsory hijab, women in Iran have the right to decide
themselves whether they wear a veil or not.

This finding mirrors the finding in the study of discourse on Islam in the British media, which
also found a greater tendency to refer to Muslim women than Muslim men and focused on a
women’s decision to wear the veil (Baker et al. 2003: 11).
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Overall, the meta-keyword analysis, the word frequency analysis, and the keyword
analysis suggest that the Vlaams Belang is more xenophobic and Islamophobic than the N-VA,
which uses more neutral language to advocate for Flemish nationalism. This suggests that, in a
network where preservationist Flemish nationalist discourse is the most dominant form of
discourse, parties that use overtly racist and Islamophobic rhetoric, like the FN and the VB, will
be at a disadvantage relative to parties, like the N-VA, which do not use overtly Islamophobic
rhetoric.
4.5

Beyond Belgium
4.5.1

The French Far-Right Network

The Front National (National Front, FN) in France is one of the most successful far-right parties
in Europe. The party is characterized by its opposition to the EU and its nationalist opposition to
immigration. Similar to the Vlaams Belang, the National Front has its roots in the interwar
fascist movement. Linkages with international and domestic fascist organizations were critical
during the establishment phase of the party. The FN was created in attempt to unify several
organizations of the French far-right including the far-right student organization Groupe Unione
Défense (GUD) and the anti-immigrant paramilitary organization Ordre Nouveau (New Order
ON). The FN has also been supported by a paramilitary organization, the Départment
Protection et Sécurité (Department for Protection and Security, DPS). Under the leadership of
Jean-Marie Le Pen, it was evident that the FN was an overly racist party with clear linkages to
extremist organizations. However, with the passing of the torch to his daughter Marine Le Pen,
many believe that the FN has moderated, pursuing a “de-demonisation” strategy and breaking its
ties with extremist groups (Gombin 2015). Marine Le Pen has upset many of the more radical
members of the FN, making “every possible attempt to cast the FN as non-anti-Semitic, more
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republican (albeit, still anti-immigration), and more acceptable to mainstream French voters” (Le
Corre 2015).
While the FN has tried to distance itself from neo-fascist extremists in recent decades, the
network map reveals that the party continues to have virtual linkages to neo-fascist and white
supremacist organizations. The network map reveals that the FN occupies the most central
position within the broader French far-right network, with dense connections to other extremist
organizations.

Figure 4.6 The French Far-Right Network

There are 374 sites in the broader French far-right network that link directly to the website of the
FN. There are a large number of organizations clustered around the FN, including the
paramilitary organization the GUD that is based in Lyon. In addition, the FN has dense ties with
the neo-fascist organization La Flamme (The Flame) which advocates against Islamization of
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Europe and celebrates white supremacy. The FN does not have to publicly acknowledge linkage
to an entity like La Flamme or GUD in order to benefit from a connection to them. Users who
visit La Flamme’s website can be directed to the site of the FN, ultimately bolstering the FN’s
ability to diffuse its policy platform. The FN is the most central and the most sustainable farright party in the French network, having achieved representation in the French National
Assembly four times over the course of its career (sustainability .10). This supports the theory
that there is a positive correlation between network centrality and party sustainability.
While the Front National is the most central party in the French far-right network, the
Mouvement National Républicain (National Republican Movement, MNR) is relatively isolated.
Mégret founded the MNR as a breakaway party from the FN in 1998. While the MNR, like the
FN, is a French nationalist party that opposes Muslim immigration to France, Mégret was
moderate relative to FN founder Le Pen, particularly in regards to anti-Semitism and Holocaust
denial (Ivaldi 2003). As the more moderate of the two wings, the MNR was unable to maintain
relationships with more radical actors in the French nationalist community. The split hurt the
performance of both parties, particularly the MNR which has never performed well at the polls.
In 2005, another faction split off from the MNR, the Parti Populist (Populist Party), seeking to
resurrect the radicalism of the movement and to support Jean-Marie Le Pen as part of the Union
Patriotique (Patriotic Union). Despite efforts to reconcile the MNR in 2006 when Jean-Marie Le
Pen was running for President, and in 2007, the two parties remain divided. The FN has an
indegree centrality (374) that is more than double that of the MNR (115). The FN has proven to
be the stronger and more sustainable of the two parties, achieving representation in the
legislature four times (sustainability .10); whereas the MNR has never exceeded the electoral
threshold (sustainability 0).
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A prominent non-party actor in the French far-right network is the regional nationalist
group, the Bloc Identitaire (Identity Bloc, BI). Founded by former members of the group Unite
Radicale and the FN, the Bloc Identitaire advocates for the protection of French and European
heritage and opposes Islamization. They have achieved notoriety in the past for serving “soupes
identitaires” (identity soups) that contain pork as a mechanism of protesting against Muslims in
major European cities (Marquand 2010). Despite the historical linkages between FN and Bloc
Identitaire, Marine Le Pen has tried to distance her party from the Bloc Identitaire in an effort to
clean house. Marie Le Pen claims that the two groups have “insurmountable ideological
differences.” She declared, “Where the FN defends national identity, [the Bloc Identitaire]
primarily promote local identities…The FN defends a Jacobin vision of society based on the
vision that it maintains the nation. This is the core of the movement that I lead” (Jarrassé).
The map of the French network reveals that the Front National does not have direct
hyperlink ties with the nationalist group Bloc Identitaire. Thus the FN’s real world effort to
distance itself from this organization appears to have a parallel in the virtual world. The two
organizations do not link to one another directly, rather they are connected through intermediary
organizations like the far-right news blog Francois Desecouche (fdesouche). The network map
suggests that the FN and Bloc Identitaire do occupy different spaces in the network, each acting
as a separate hub with its own cluster around it. The Bloc Identitaire is densely connected to
regional organizations like Jeune Alsace (Alsace Youth), which reject the system of the nationstate. However, overall, the network has more nationalist organizations than regionalist
organizations, which puts the FN at a more central position in the network, with 347 incoming
links compared to the 111 of the Bloc Identitaire.
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While the FN and Bloc Identitaire are not directly linked through hyperlinks on their
websites, there is evidence that the two groups have overlapping Twitter followers. 4,471 of the
followers of Bloc Identitaire or 50% of its followership also follows the FN. However, the
overlap is asymmetrical. More Bloc Identitaire supporters follow the FN than vice versa. Only
3% of total followers of the FN also follow the Bloc Identitaire. This finding is consistent with
those who believe, despite the FN’s efforts to distance itself from Bloc Identitaire, some
members within the Bloc Identitaire support the FN with a hope that it can push the party’s
agenda in a more radical direction. For example, Jarrassé (2014) argues that Bloc Identiitaire has
tried to form a sort of alliance with the FN, but that it has been resisted by both Jean-Marie Le
Pen and Marine Le Pen. Nevertheless, members of the youth wing of the Bloc Identitiare have
worked for FN campaigns and some, like Damien Rieu, have even been hired to work for FN
officials (Le Monde 2014). Thus, the FN may benefit from the support of members of the Bloc
Identitaire both on and offline, even though the two organizations do not have a formal
relationships and do not link to one another on their official websites.

Figure 4.7 Comparison of Twitter Followers: FN, Bloc Identitaire, and GUD Lyon
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In addition to an overlap in Twitter followership with the Bloc Identitaire, the FN has an overlap
with the GUD, a finding consistent with the linkages between the organizations on the network
map. 268 or 15% of the followers of the Lyon branch of the GUD also follow the FN. While the
FN continues to deny any linkages with this organization, this finding is consistent with other
studies show that some followers of the FN do belong to or support this violent paramilitary
organization (Marcus 1995).
Overall, the network map reveals that the FN is the most central and sustainable party in
the French far-right network. The FN’s position is more central than that of the MNR, which is
relatively isolated and less sustainable. Despite the efforts of Marie Le Pen to clean up the
party’s image and distance the FN from neo-fascist and white supremacist organizations, there is
evidence that the FN does have linkages with the paramilitary organization the GUD and the
Bloc Identitaire.
4.5.2

The British Far-Right Network

Britain has a strong far-right network with three far-right parties, the British National Party
(BNP), the National Front (NF), and the UK Independence Party (UKIP). The National Front is
the older and more radical of the parties, founded in 1967 to oppose the immigration of nonwhite persons to the UK. The party denies that it is a neo-fascist group; however it does have
ties with fascist parties locally and abroad. Paul Wilkinson notes, “though they try to play down
their past affiliations with more blatantly Nazi movements…they covertly maintain intimate
connections with small neo-Nazi cells in Britain and abroad, because all their beliefs and motives
make this not only tactically expedient but effective” (Wilkinson 73). The British National Party
was formed after a split in the National Front in 1982 and seeks to achieve Britain for
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“indigenous Britons.” The party opposes multiculturalism and the Islamification of the UK.
UKIP is the newest of the three parties and was founded in 1993. While the party self-identifies
as libertarian and not far-right, scholars have grouped it into the far-right family (Trilling 2012).
The party’s primary emphasis is on Euroscepticism; however it does advocate restrictive
immigration policies and the majority of its supporters believe that Islam does pose a danger to
the West (Goodwin 2012). In addition it has used anti-immigrant rhetoric when politically
expedient (Art 2011).

Figure 4.8 The British Far-Right Network
The most central and most sustainable actor in the British far-right network is the UKIP. UKIP
has an indegree centrality of 341, nearly 6 times that of its competitor parties, the NF and the
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BNP. UKIP has proven to be more sustainable than its competitor parties, earning a higher
percentage of the vote share in the legislative elections in 2001, 2005, 2010, and 2015. The party
reached an all-time peak in electoral performance in 2015, earning 12.6% of the vote share and 1
seat in the House (sustainability .04). It also performed well in the European Parliament
elections, earning 27.5 of the vote share and 24 seats. Many of the most extreme actors in the
network are not closely linked to UKIP, which appears to supports the parties claim that it is a
moderate, non-violent organization. Many of the overtly white supremacist or neo-Nazi
organizations, like the November 9th Society/Britain First Party are noticeably distant from
UKIP. Despite this distance, there is a linkage from the Britain First Party’s site to UKIP’s site,
suggesting a tie of affiliation between the organizations. The party leader Nigel Farage has
dismissed connections to Britain First and has called its members “racists and extremists”
(Farage 2015). In addition, the leader of Britain First, Paul Golding, has actively endorsed
UKIP, offered to send armored vehicles to protect UKIP, and claimed that 2015 will be the “year
of Britain First and UKIP” (Cusick 2015). In addition, while there is a distance between UKIP,
BNP, and BNF in the network map, there are links coming from BNP and BNF to UKIP’s
website. Regardless of whether or not a party like UKIP publically acknowledges its linkages
with more extreme far-right actors, the fact that these actors actively endorse them could help the
party increase its vote share.
The British National Party occupies a less central position than UKIP, but is more central
than the National Front. The BNP has incoming links from 59 other sites in the network
compared to 50 for the National Front. While the National Front has been in existence longer,
overall, the BNP is the more sustainable of the two parties when comparing vote share and the
number of times each party has exceeded the electoral threshold. A member of the BNP earned a
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seat in the London assembly in 2008 and the parties won two seats in European Parliament in
2009 and had more than 50 local councilors (sustainability .03). The BNP achieved a peak in its
performance in the general elections when it earned 1.9% of the vote in the 2010. In contrast, the
NF earned 0% of the vote in the 2010 general elections and has never earned a seat in parliament
(sustainability 0).

Followers only of bnp 7,067
Followers only of NF_14Words 369
Followers only of UKIP 118,533
Followers of BNP and NF_14 Words 138
Followers of BNP and UKIP 3,820
Followers of NF_14Words and UKIP 72
Followers of all three 147

Figure 4.9 Comparison of Twitter Followers: BNP, UKIP, BNF

Combined total followers 130,146

There is a substantial and asymmetrical overlap in the followers of the British National
Party and UKIP which suggests that the BNP is vulnerable to competition from UKIP. 118,533
or 97% of UKIP’s followers only follow UKIP and do not follow the other two parties. 7,607 or
63% of BNP’s followers only follow the BNP, but 34% of BNP’s followers also follow UKIP.
In contrast only 3% of UKIP’s followers also follow the BNP. This evidence is consistent with
the claims made by scholars, journalists, and party members that UKIP is largely to blame for the
demise of the BNP. UKIP party leader Nigel Farage claims that “No one has done more damage
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to the BNP than me,” asserting that UKIP has captured nearly 1/3 of BNP’s voters (Farage
2016).

British scholar of the far-right Matthew Goodwin also sees a “clear relationship

between the rise of UKIP in local elections and the disintegration of the BNP,” which he believes
is not surprising considering that “the same social groups are underpinning both parties, as they
are radical right parties across Europe” (Goodwin 2016). The rise of UKIP as a niche competitor
in British far-right network parallels the rise of N-VA as a niche competitor in the Belgian farright network. This finding suggests that there is support for the theoretical claim that a far-right
party can become vulnerable to a niche competitor within the broader far-right family.
The National Front has a relatively smaller followership than the other two parties. While
there are overlapping memberships between the NF and the other two parties, it does not appear
that either party is presently a significant niche competitor for the NF. Only 138 or 3% of the
National Front’s followers also follow the BNP. Similarly only 72 or 1% of NF’s followers also
follow UKIP. While the NF cannot presently blame its poor electoral performance on
phagocytosis of the other parties, it is important to remember that this graphic of overlapping
memberships only captures a moment in time. In the past, factionalism impacted the NF and
motivated former party leader John Tyndall to create the New National Front in 1980 which was
subsequently absorbed into the British National Party.
Overall, the network analysis of the British far-right suggests that the most central actor
in the network, UKIP, is also the most sustainable and that it has benefited from its relationships
with other extremist actors in the network, even when it has denied the relationship. In addition,
the network map suggests that UKIP is a niche competitor for the BNP, given the asymmetrical
overlapping memberships of the two organizations, which suggests that UKIP has been able to
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capture former BNP supporters. The most isolated actor in the British far-right network is the
National Front, which is on the fringe of the network and has loose ties with other actors.

Followers only of EDL
Followers only of UKIP
Followers only of BNP
Followers of EDL and UKIP
Followers of EDL and BNP
Followers of UKIP and BNP
Followers of all three
Combined total followers

3,087
118,314
6,926
1,329
306
3,406
612
133,980

Figure 4.10 Comparison of Twitter Followers of EDL, UKIP, and BNP
The English Defence League (EDL) was created in 2009 and is the most significant far-right
street movement in the UK and has been involved in a number of violent anti-Muslim protests in
recent years.11 The movement claims that it is committed to “protect the inalienable rights of all
people to protest against radical Islam’s encroachment into the lives of non-Muslims” (English
Defence League 2014). With an estimated 25,000-35,000 supporters, this organization is a
major player within the broader British far-right network. Regardless of whether or not a farright party publicly acknowledges ties with the EDL, the loyalty of the EDL to a party could
substantially bolster the party’s network power. While the EDL is sometimes understood as an

11

For more information about the violence perpetrated by the English Defence league see Matthew Taylor English
Defence League: Inside the Violent World of Britain’s Far-right.” The Guardian 28 May 2010; Kevin Rawlinson and
Lauren York. “EDL to spread its far-right creed to new target towns.” Independent, 13 January 2012.
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organization that appeals to those who are disenchanted with party politics and prefer direct
action against immigrant communities, there is evidence that the EDL has linkages with far-right
parties. In fact, the BNP has actively pursued a strengthening of its relationship with the EDL in
the past in an effort to keep the party from splintering. The UK Team of the Extremis Project
notes:
Since 2010, the BNP has been ramping up its involvement in non-electoral activities,
partly as an attempt to flirt with disgruntled factions of the English Defence
League….Far-right parties like the BNP are also social movements, which view
electioneering simply as one of several strategies available to them. Just as important as
the quest for votes is sustaining a loyal band of true believers-through the good times, and
the bad (Extremis Project 2012).
Despite the BNP’s efforts to strengthen its relationship with the EDL, the analysis of the Twitter
followership of the EDL suggests that the organization presently has stronger ties to UKIP than it
does to the BNP. 25% of EDL followers also follow UKIP. In contrast only 5% of EDL
followers follow EDL and the BNP.

This is somewhat surprising considering surveys that

indicate that the BNP is the favored party of the EDL and that UKIP supporters are less inclined
to support violent action than the BNP (Goodwin and Evans 2012). However, it is possible that
the relationship between the EDL and BNP has changed in recent years as UKIP has become a
stronger niche competitor within the network. While UKIP has claimed that “UKIP has no
association with, or support for, the EDL” and has banned EDL members from joining the party,
there are incidents of EDL members holding “I’m voting UKIP” signs at rallies (Culbertson
2015). The evidence suggests that UKIP may have successfully hijacked the BNP, stealing away
votes not only of former BNP members, but also the support of EDL members who had
previously been loyal to the BNP.
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4.6

Chapter Summary

Many far-right parties refute claims that they are tied to more extreme organizations; however
there is substantial evidence that indicates there are indeed dense networks based on formal and
informal ties. Those with an interest in understanding the far-right have focused on broad
socioeconomic conditions or the structure of the electoral system. Yet in order to gain a more
sophisticated understanding of the far-right, it is important to examine the subculture in which
they operate. Through social network analysis, researchers and policymakers have the potential
to identify patterns of relationships between organizations on the far-right. Despite the limited
size of many of these organizations, they still have the potential to influence the sustainability of a
party over time.
Organizational ties within the far-right network provide a foundation upon which a party
can be built. Parties like the Vlaams Belang have relied on recruitment from other organizations
to form its activist core. While the VB has begun to publicly disassociate from fascist
organizations, the evidence suggests that it remains connected to them online, which facilitates
the diffusion of its agenda. Similarly, the French National Front and Britain’s UKIP are the most
central actors in their broader far-right networks, with dense ties to other far-right organizations.
Overall these cases suggest that a central position within a strong nationalist subculture is a part
of the recipe for success.
It is less clear how a party’s ideological position in a network impacts its trajectory.
However, the exploratory analysis of Belgian far right discourse suggests that preservationist
Flemish nationalism is the dominant discourse in the network. While Islamophobia is also
present in the network, it is not as prevalent. This suggests that parties with Flemish nationalist
discourse will be closer to the ideological center of the network and that parties that use overtly
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racist and Islamophobic rhetoric will be relative peripheral. Further research is needed to
confirm these findings. Specifically, one would have to construct a corpus that is representative
of the entirety of the Belgian far right’s discourse and compare this corpus to the corpus of each
party to determine whether or not a party is a good ideological match with the broader network.
A comparison of the discourse used by the Vlaams Belang and the NVA revealed that the
former is more Islamophobic, making references to the threat Islam poses to security and to
women’s rights. In contrast, the NVA does not use overtly Islamophobic rhetoric or equate
Islam with criminality and instead focuses on the necessity of law and order. Given that both the
Vlaams Belang and NVA are Flemish nationalist parties in a predominantly Flemish nationalist
network, the Vlaams Belang’s use of Islamophobic rhetoric places it on the ideological fringe.
5
5.1

COMPETITION IN THE BELGIAN NETWORK

The Organizational History of Flemish Nationalism
The Flemish nationalist movements dates back to the 1830s when Belgium became an

independent country. The early Flemish nationalist movement was primarily a linguistic
movement and focused its efforts on having Dutch recognized as an official language
(Klandermans and Mayer 2009: 21). The movement politicized after the First World War and
turned extreme right wing during the Second World War when the Vlaams Nationaal Verbond
(VNV-Flemish National Union) collaborated with the Germans in the hopes of achieving an
independent Flemish nation. Following the war, the radical branch of the movement was largely
discredited and leaders of the movement were imprisoned for their collaboration. While the
movement was no longer mainstream, it continued to exist along the fringe as a number of small
extremist groups. These groups helped form the Volksunie in 1954 and eventually split from the
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party in the 1970s, when they felt the organization had become too moderate. This is when the
far-right party Vlaams Blok was formed.
Around the same time as the establishment of the Volksunie, the Vlaamse
Volksbeweging (VVB-Flemish People’s Movement) – a Flemish nationalist think tank and
lobbying organization – was established by Maurits Coppitiers as an anti-fascist Flemish
nationalist movement. The organization is not directly affiliated with any political party;
however they advocate for an independent Flanders and celebrate Flemish language and culture.
5.1.1

The Role of Youth Movements in the Flemish Nationalist Network

Student organizations and youth movements have played a vital role in the creation and
duration of the Flemish nationalist network, particularly in the radical branch of the Flemish
nationalist family. The Flemish nationalist Volksunie was established in the 1950s and the youth
wing of the movement, the Vlaamse Nationale Jeugd (VNJ, Flemish Nationalist Youth
Association) was established in the 1960s. The VNJ is based in Flanders and is similar to the
Boy Scouts in its activities, which include summer camps, a youth band, and participation in
marches and commemorative ceremonies. Critics of the movement refer to it as a neo-fascist
organization; however the movement does not self-identify as fascist, but rather as a nationalist
organization. Many families of the radical wing of the Flemish nationalist movement have their
children participate in the VNJ and this helps develop the Flemish nationalist social network. In
his study of Flemish radicalism, De Witte noted that there was a “great deal of continuity from
youth to adulthood,” in the movement and that members would often be approached be
representatives from other Flemish nationalist organizations and asked to join (De Witte 2006:
431). The following excerpt from an interview with a member of Voorpost-the radical Flemish
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paramilitary organization-illustrates the role of youth movements as introductions to the broader
Flemish radical network:
My grandfather was in the CNS. He had been a teacher. My family branches were previously Flemish
nationalist, not in a pronounced way, but the reflex was there. After the war, my grandfather spent seven
years in prison, mainly I think because he was a teacher, and that was unsavory, collaboration as an
educator. My grandfather after the war spent seven years in prison, mainly I think because he was a
teacher, because that was usually taken unsavory, collaboration as an educator. My grandmother was
imprisoned for a while. I grew up in the Flemish Movement. My parents took us to the bigger activities
(Iron Pilgrimage, singing parties). At 6 years old, I joined the VNJ. That is an ideological youth movement,
where many are children of Flemish nationalists. When I was 16 I went in the direction of the VNJ, and on
my 20th birthday, I was active in the Language Action Komité (TAK), which my father was also active in.
It was the overarching [aspect of the Flemish movement] which interested me, because with more people
that you can achieve more. In my region, the TAK actions were always performed with Outpost, because
the positions overlap of both organizations. At a certain point X asked me to become a member of Outpost.
I considered this because I stood by Outpost ideologically, and because I had already participated…It is
assumed, when one is from my background, that he is already a little Outpost. It really has not changed
much…I have recently become a member of the Vlaams Blok (De Witte 2006: 431).

5.2

Niche Competitors: The N-VA and Vlaams Belang
5.2.1

The Rise of the N-VA

The Vlaams Belang, a far-right Flemish nationalist party, performed well in municipal and
national level elections in 2006, establishing itself as the second strongest party in Belgian
politics. However, in the 2012 and 2014 Belgian parliamentary elections, the Vlaams Belang fell
from the second-ranked party to the fifth, largely due to the rise of the N-VA. The N-VA,
formed in 2001, has been able to increase its vote share dramatically from 3.1% in 2003 to 20%
in 2014, making it the largest party in Flanders and leader in the Flemish Government.
The Vlaams Belang was the clear loser in the 2014 elections, earning only 3.7 % of the
votes in the parliamentary elections and losing nine federal seats and 15 in the Flemish
Parliament. Despite claims to the contrary from Vlaams Belang party leadership, many
perceived the election as the death knell for the party (Otte 2014).
N-VA was successful, in part, because it was able to capture a large number of votes
from those who previously would have voted for Vlaams Belang. Swyngedouw’s study
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revealed that the VB lost 231,500 voters to N-VA in 2010 or 32% of those who would have
voted for the VB in 2007, a process which he refers to as the “phagocytosis” of the VB. "We
knew that the N-VA has taken much from the VB, but we did not think it was so much. This is
incredible!” (Swyngedouw 2012). Leading member of the Vlaams Belang in Antwerp, Filip
Dewinter, acknowledged this capture: “N-VA has just proved that they are just naughty enough
to charm the voters of the VB and just clean enough to please the traditional parties” (Dewinter
2014). Dewinter implied that he, and other members of the Vlaams Belang had dismissed the NVA as a minor player in the past, but that the party had become more sophisticated over time and
began to pose a legitimate threat to the survival of the Vlaams Belang. “The competition was
right,” Dewinter asserted, “the puppy that the N-VA was then has become a bloodhound.”
The N-VA’s ability to capture voters from the VB was facilitated by the fact that it
occupied a similar niche. Both parties are Flemish nationalist parties and, as such, are competing
for the Flemish nationalist vote. Peter Thijssen argued that the “preexisting relationships with
the Flemish nationalist movement have bolstered” the success of both the N-VA and VB.12 A
study by Marc Swyngedouw at the University of Leuven revealed that in 2007, 57% of those in
favor of a divided Belgium voted for the Vlaams Belang. By 2010, only 21.5 of those in favor
voted for Vlaams Belang, whereas the N-VA attracted 49% of the radically pro-Flemish vote.13
The Vlaams Belang and its predecessor the Vlaams Blok played a significant role in shaping the
Flemish nationalist agenda. The party has its origins in the pro-Flemish Volksunie, but split
from the organization due to tensions over the federalization of Belgium. The founding
members of the Vlaams Blok felt that the Volksunie had become too liberal and was giving too
much power to francophone Belgium. The Vlaams Blok recruited its initial members from
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Interwith with Peter Thijssen ,Skype Interivew, 5 February, 2013.
Klaas Debacker. “Welke kiezers willen splitsing Belgie?” De Standaard. February 14, 2014.
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radical Flemish organizations including Were Di, the Vlaams Militanten Ordre (VMO) and
Voorpost. The Vlaams Blok was a minor player in Belgian politics throughout the 1970s and
1980s and earned only a single seat in the Chamber of Representatives in the elections of 1978,
1981, and 1985.
The Vlaams Blok became more influential throughout the 1980s and 1990s by combining
a Flemish separatist agenda with an anti-immigrant agenda, mirroring the platform of successful
far-right parties like France’s Front National. By 1995, the Vlaams Blok had 7.8 % of the vote
and by 1999 it was the third largest party in Flanders, with 33 of the vote in Antwerp (Downs
2012: 92).
Despite this increase in popularity, the Vlaams Blok was considered a pariah by the
political establishment and was subjected to a cordon sanitaire beginning in 1989 when the five
major political parties promised to refuse “political agreement or negotiations with the Vlaams
Blok, be it in the context of democratically elected bodies on the local, national, and European
levels, or in the context of elections for these bodies” (Coffee 2005, 213). In the 1990s, the
Vlaams Blok, under the leadership of Filip Dewinter, adopted the 70-points plan, which focused
on mandatory repatriation of immigrants and prohibiting the practice of Islam to curtail the
diffusion of Islamic fundamentalism. Many felt the 70-points plan was in violation of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and there was renewed support for maintaining
the cordon against the party. The cordon was renewed in 2002, as the major parties agreed not to
join in an alliance with “nondemocratic parties.” Despite this cordon, the Vlaams Blok had a
successful year at the polls and, in 2004, earned 11.6 percent of the national vote and 18.1
percent of the vote in Flanders. However, in June of 2004, the Vlaams Blok was found guilty of
“permanent incitement to segregation and racism” in the city of Ghent. This decision was upheld
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by the Belgium’s Supreme Court later that year and the party lost access to state funding, was
barred from the media, and effectively disbanded as a consequence.
The party quickly reorganized itself under the same party leader (Filip Dewinter), but
with a new name, the Vlaams Belang. In the wake of the formal declaration that the party had a
racist agenda, the Vlaams Belang softened its anti-immigrant platform from mandatory
repatriation to repatriation only for those who “deny or combat our culture and certain European
values such as separation of church and state, liberty of expression, and equality between men
and women” (Vlaams Belang 2004: 495). However, the Flemish nationalist agenda remained
intact as the party continued to demand an independent Flanders with Belgium as the capital and
amnesty for Flemish nationalist who collaborated with the Nazis during the Second World War.
Party leader Dewinter admitted that the changes were primarily cosmetic and that “they had
nothing to do with content and everything to do with tactic.” One might think that, with a similar
platform to a party declared to be in violation of national law, the Vlaams Belang would be
doomed to electoral failure. Yet the Vlaams Belang enjoyed electoral success throughout the
next decade. According to Belgian political scientist, Lieven De Winter, “the psychological
threshold is already passed. For Flemish voters, a vote for the Blok is seen as a legitimate
option” (De Winter 2004). One of the founding members of the Vlaams Blok and current
member of the Vlaams Belang agreed that the agenda, particularly in regards to Flemish
independence, has increased in legitimacy over time:
When we started in the late 70s, we talked about Flemish independence and everybody
called us crazy, nowadays almost the majority of people agree that it is possible…now
even the Green Party admits that there need to be adaptations to multiculturalism….”14

14

Interview with far-right party member 2, June 2014.
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In 2005, a public opinion poll revealed that over 50% of Flemish people believed the Vlaams
Belang should be represented in the federal government (Vaes 2005). In 2006, the Vlaams
Belang experienced a victory at the polls, nearly doubling its seats in the parliament from 439 to
800. In 2007, the party won 17 seats in the Chamber of Representatives and five in the Senate.
The Vlaams Belang was beginning to be considered one of the most successful far-right parties
in Europe. According to the political scientist Stefaan Walgrave, “the party’s base used to be
working class, but now it has become mainstream” (2006).
The Vlaams Belang began to suffer at the polls beginning in 2009, with the rise of the NVA. The N-VA was established in 2001 and, like the Vlaams Belang, has its roots in the
Volksunie and has a Flemish separatist agenda. The party was founded by seven members of the
Volksunie with Geert Bourgeois, former chairman of the Volksunie serving as chairman. The
party’s “final target is indeed an independent Flanders as a European member state,” however it
asserts that it wants the process to occur gradually rather than through a revolution. The N-VA
began contesting elections in 2003, but it did not achieve the electoral threshold in any region of
Belgium apart from Western Flanders. Despite these results, Bourgeois was not discouraged,
claiming that “he did not want to seem pretentious, but I think we might be the people’s party
and we may already be” (Bourgeois 2003).
He distinguished the N-VA from the Vlaams Belang, saying, “they call themselves the
right, but attract mostly dissatisfied SPA voters.”15 The N-VA began to enjoy electoral success
after forming an alliance with the Christian Democrats (CD&V) in 2004, winning 18.5% of the
overall vote in the federal parliamentary elections. That same year the party replaced Geert
Bourgeois with Bart De Wever becoming the new head of the party. By 2010, the N-VA had
become the largest political party in Belgium, a position that was reaffirmed in the federal
15

Ibid.
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elections of 2014 and the party leader Bart De Wever is presently serving as the mayor of
Antwerp.
The N-VA owes its success, in part, to votes that it was able to capture from the Vlaams
Belang. This vote capture was made possible by the fact that the N-VA is competing within the
same niche of Flemish nationalism. One founding member of the Vlaams Belang acknowledged:
Now we have a big competitor with the N-VA with Bart De Wever who has taken a lot of our ideas.
Our people believe that he has taken a lot of our ideas. Essentially he just made people believe that
he has the same ideas, but they are not the same at all…When Bart De Wever came with his party,
they saw that as an opportunity to frame us as the bad guys and Bart De Wever as the better guys….they
made them believe ‘here you have a perfect alternative for the Vlaams Belang.’ 16

Walgrave et. al’s study (2011:14) of Belgian party manifestos confirms that there is a strong
similarity in the agendas of the Vlaams Belang and the N-VA, with an overlap score of 70.4.
This means that approximately 70% of the stances they take on various issues are similar. The
key similarity is the agenda of Flemish nationalism. Both organizations have roots in the
Volksunie and feel that Flanders should be an independent state. Additionally, they both feel
that Wallonia is holding Flanders back from realizing its true potential:
Vlaams Belang Party Manifesto:
Within Belgium can be no good governance. What a naïve observer would think is that the country is
In good hands…but nothing could be less true. Federalism is the wrong way to get Flanders where it is
entitled to be. Federalism is a strategy of the French-speaking politicians to force the Flemings to make
concessions.17

N-VA Party Manifesto:
The federal government is underperforming…One does not have to look far to find the reason for
this substandard performance: each time the Flemings throttle the federal government forward, Wallonia
stands on the brakes.18
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Interview conducted with member of Vlaams Belang member 3, June 2014.
Volkens et al. The Party Manifesto Collection. Berlin: Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung
(WZB).
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While the two are in agreement regarding Flemish independence, this is a strategic
distinction. Vlaams Belang loyalists emphasize that the N-VA is too gradual in its approach and
that they are in favor of a more immediate solution:
Though the N-VA claims to be for Flemish independence, the strategy to obtain that in our view is so
wrong…if you have the same goal, but your strategy is so different, it is impossible to cooperate. We want
a call for independence tomorrow. We want a revolution, they want evolution. We see that evolution only
leads to a stronger Belgium. We see that as contradictory. 19

5.2.2

Competition in the Anti-Immigrant Niche

The core of the Flemish nationalist network is Flemish nationalist, but no overtly racist. Thus,
many of the actors in the Flemish nationalist community would like more restrictive immigration
policies in order to preserve Dutch language and a Flemish identity. Both the N-VA and the NVA overlap in their advocacy for more restrictive immigration policies. The parties are also in
agreement that the Belgian immigration policy in the previous decades was too permissive and
contributed to the rise of radical Islam.
Filip De Winter of Vlaams Belang: Tolerance, mass Muslim immigration, and multiculturalism effectively
shut down all criticisms of Islam…If we don’t take steps to stop Islamization now, we will see many more
Charlie Hebdo type attacks.”
Bart De Wever of N-VA: We allowed (to come) the wrong kind of migrants en masse and too little has
been done….the recent bad immigration policy was the cause of the radicalization of certain Muslim youth
and therefore the large number of Belgium jihadists to fight in Syria. 20

The similarity in the agendas helps explain why it was easy for some voters to transition from the
Vlaams Belang to the N-VA. Vlaams Belang party members believe that the N-VA intentionally
coopted aspects of its agenda in an effort to capture votes. Vlaams Belang party leader Tom
Van Grieken asserted that voters were tricked into believing that the agenda of the VB and the
N-VA were one and the same, saying “I think some voters did leave the VB for the N-VA
because perception is reality and the perception is that we have a similar party program, but that
19
20
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is not a reality.”21 Specifically, Van Grieken sees a major difference between the two parties
when it comes to immigration policy. The Vlaams Belang advocates repatriation for illegal
immigration and those who do not assimilate into Belgian society, whereas the N-VA feels that
immigration is appropriate to fill job vacancies in key industries. The promotion of economic
migration is a distinguishing feature of the N-VA. Specifically, they believe immigrants should
only be allowed in if they will be an asset to the country in the professional and academic
domains. For example, in 2014 there was a scarcity of nurses, and N-VA supported allowing
immigrants to come and fill the vacancies in that industry. However, this difference is not as
significant as one might expect. Both the N-VA and Vlaams Belang make a distinction between
desirable and undesirable immigrants, they merely differ in their definition of desirability. The
Vlaams Belang emphasizes the immigrant’s ability to culturally assimilate into Belgian society,
whereas the N-VA emphasizes the immigrant’s ability to economically assimilate into Belgian
society. In addition, when one moves beyond the party manifesto and examines the rhetoric of
the N-VA, it is clear that there is an ethnic or cultural component to their definitions of
desirability. For example, Bart de Wever made a statement of the Flemish television news
program Terzake, suggesting that Moroccan immigrants posed a challenge to Belgian society:
Well, then we’re talking about people from North Africa, in particular the Moroccan
communities and especially Berbers. And 80% of the Moroccans in Antwerp are from
Berber origin. We are having a hard time to organize social mobility in that community.
They are also very closed communities who distrust the government. [They have a]
weakly organised Islam, are very susceptible to the salafist stream and as such also to
radicalisation and that is of course not the best publicity. People who turn on the
television and see day after day decapitations and while people here sympathize with that,
or even go there to participate…

Two Moroccan human rights organizations, Movement X and the Moroccan human rights
association, filed a formal complaint of racism against Bart de Wever for the above comments
21
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the implied linkage between immigrants from the Maghreb and increasing crime rates. They
also asserted that De Wever’s claim that he “never met an Asian in Antwerp who says ‘I am a
victim of racism’ implied that Asians are “good immigrants” and Maghrebis are “bad
immigrants.”22 Thus, both the N-VA and the Vlaams Belang seem to share a reluctance to admit
certain ethnic groups of immigrants into the country. In addition, the two parties both believe
that there should be stricter asylum policies, more discouragement of illegal immigration, and an
immigrant repatriation policy.
5.2.3

Evaluating the N-VA as a “non-racist” Alternative to the Vlaams Belang

The overtly racist and Islamophobic rhetoric of the Vlaams Belang placed it on the ideological
fringe of the Flemish nationalist network. It was able to perform well despite this because it was
one of the only parties to advocate for a more restrictive immigration policy; however, with the
rise of the N-VA, the Vlaams Belang now has a competitor from within its own network that is
more ideologically centrist and is perceived as a non-racist alternative to the N-VA. There is an
undeniable overlap in the policy preferences of the N-VA and the Vlaams Belang; however
many believe that the key difference between the two lies not in the platform, but in the rhetoric.
While both parties want immigration restriction, the Vlaams Belang has used overtly racist
ideological rhetoric that is on the fringe relative to the rhetoric used by the Flemish nationalist
network on the whole. The N-VA has emerged offering similar policies, but its rhetoric is not
overtly racist, which helps it occupy a more central ideological position in the network than the
VB. There is a perception that the Vlaams Belang is a racist party and the N-VA is not.

One

member of N-VA suggested that the reason why the N-VA was able to capture votes from the
VB in 2014 is because it provided a non-racist alternative:
22
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When Vlaams Belang appeared years ago, it became a resort for people who were not happy with the
existing parties…But that new party did not translate exactly what the people wanted because the people
did not want to become racist. Originally the supports of Vlaams Belang came from the Socialist party, the
Green party…because they felt that something has to change. And then N-VA appears with no racist
intentions whatsoever, so people are coming from Vlaams Belang….Now the N-VA comes with no racist
intentions at all and this is what they want.

There is sufficient evidence to bolster the claim that the Vlaams Belang is a racist party.
It was able to succeed with overtly racist rhetoric and despite a party ban because it did not have
a strong niche competitor within the Flemish nationalist network. The predecessor of the
Vlaams Belang, the Vlaams Blok was found to be guilty of racism by the Belgian Court of
Cessation. When the party reorganized under a new name, but with many of the same members
and ideological platforms, there was a little reason to believe that the racist viewpoints of the
party had changed for the better. Members of mainstream parties continued to perceive the
Vlaams Belang as a pariah and pledged not to associate with them. Guy Verhofstadts of CV&D
declared, “Vlaams Belang is run by fascists.” Much of the controversy surrounding the Vlaams
Belang and race has centered on former party leader, Filip Dewinter. Dewinter, in particular,
was singled out as a neo-fascist. He was known to advocate for the amnesty for those who
collaborated with the Nazis during World War II, he put flowers on their graves, he befriended
Nazi Bert Erikkson (leader of the neo-Nazi movement in Antwerp and commander of the neofascist militant organization the VMO in the 1970s), and he had a reputation for making racially
offensive comments at rallies and in interviews.
Despite the affiliation with neo-fascism and neo-Nazism, most of Dewinter’s, and the
Vlaams Belang as a whole, rhetoric is not anti-Semitic, but Islamophobic. Both the Vlaams
Belang and the N-VA want support from the large Jewish community in Antwerp and Dewinter,
while a controversial figure in the Jewish community, repeatedly asserts that he is sympathetic
with the suffering of the Jewish people during the Holocaust. However, Dewinter is decidedly
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unsympathetic towards Muslims and has written a book about the threat Islam poses to European
civilization. He sees the hijab and the burqa is symbols of women’s oppression under Islam and
has even gone so far as to say that “if Mohammad were alive today, I would call him a
terrorist.”23 He has also written a book, Inch Allah, about the dangers of Islamization and, during
his political tour of the United States in 2011, Dewinter posted the following message on his
website about the threat Islam poses to Europe:
Islam is Europe’s hereditary enemy. Islam is a religion of conquest that tried two times to subject
Europe…The third Islamic invasion is taking place as we speak…Islam is like a predator. It only attacks
weak preys. Europe is weak. Europe is on the verge of extinction, losing its identity and culture and
becoming an economic giant on clay feet. Europe is not only committing a demographic suicide, but is
terrified to defend the norms and values of our European civilization. Just like aids affects the physical
resistance of human beings, multiculturalism affects the identity and demographic resistance of a people
and a civilization. Islam takes advantage of our weakness and behaves like a cuckoo that lays its egg in the
warm European nest (Dewinter 2011).

Filip Dewinter also launched a controversial ad campaign
in 2012 on the theme “Women against Islamization” in which
his daughter An-Sofie Dewinter, posed in a bikini and a burqa,
asking viewers: “Freedom or Islam? We must dare to choose.”
The campaign coincided with the release of VB Senator Anke
Van Dermeersch’s book Hoer Noch Slavin (Whore Not Slave),
which details ways in which Islam promotes discrimination and
humiliation of women. Van Dermeersch is the leader of the
Figure 5.1
Freedom or Islam
Campaign

“Women against Islamization” campaign and played a pivotal
role in getting legislation passed to ban the burqa throughout
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Belgium.24 For his part, Dewinter has been unapologetic for the statements he and his
party have made against Islam and recently even embraced the label “racist” on Twitter,
saying:
#racist has not become a term of abuse, but honorific. Criticism of
immigration/Islam/multiculturalism= #racism…#ikbenracistendaarbenikfierop. –Filip Dewinter

Despite this overtly racist and Islamophobic rhetoric, under Dewinter’s leadership, the
party was able to achieve 11.3% of the vote in the Belgian federal elections in 2003, 14.3% of
the votes in the European Parliament, and 12% of the vote in the Belgian federal elections of
2007. All of these elections took place prior to the emergence of the N-VA as a niche competitor
of the Vlaams Belang.
5.2.4. The Subtle Racism of the N-VA
The core of the Flemish nationalist movement is not overtly racist, rather they tend to emphasize
nationalism and the failures of multiculturalism (De Witte 2006). In order to appeal to the
Flemish nationalist core and distinguish itself from the Vlaams Belang, the N-VA markets itself
to the public as a non-racist alternative. In their study of far-right Islamophobia, Ansari and
Hafrez argue that “explicit opposition to the racist aspects in the VB programme are part of the
N-VA programme” and that “if you look at the N-VA you immediately see the picture of a nice
‘black’ girl representing, among others, the image of the N-VA” (2012: 79). However, when it
comes to the degree of racism exhibited by each party, I would argue that there is more
convergence than divergence. In the words of one supporter of the N-VA, “their views [about
race] aren’t really that different, the N-VA just sells it better.”25 The racism of the N-VA is more
subtle than the Vlaams Belang. For example, one can examine their promotional materials. In
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2011, the Vlaams Belang borrowed a popular, but controversial ad campaign from the antiimmigrant Swiss People’s Party. In the Swiss version, a white sheep superimposed over the
Swiss flag is kicking a black sheep out of the country. In the version by the Vlaams Belang, the
Belgian flag is added alongside the Swiss, and the sheep being kicked out is a red one,
symbolizing Turkey and Morocco. This overtly racist imagery is easily identifiable and could
limit the appeal of the Vlaams Belang to those who are comfortable with blatant expressions of
racism.
The imagery the N-VA uses in its discourse on migration policy is also racialized, but
rather than using overt racism, the N-VA uses subtle racist imagery (Coltrane and Messineo
2000, Shabbir et al. 2014). In its party program from 2007, the N-VA chose to put an image of
two baby chicks, one yellow and one black. While one could argue that the colors yellow and
black were chosen primarily because they are the color of Flanders, the two colors are also laden
with racial connotations. The structure of the image creates a subtle racial bias. Positioning the
lighter colored check on the left side of the image is a subtle way to reinforce its superiority. Art
psychologists find that most right-handed people who read left to right, have “left preferences,”
when they view images and will find the object on the left more aesthetically pleasing than the
object on the right (Nachson et al. 1999). The lighter colored chick is also larger than the black
chick, which implies dominance. Finally, the entire image is reminiscent of the original cartoon
with the white and black sheep created by the Swiss People’s Party. This image received
worldwide publicity the year that it came out, 2007, which—perhaps not coincidentally—is the
same year that the N-VA incorporated this image in its official party platform.
The core of the Belgian far-right network is nationalist, but not overly racist or
Islamophobic. As a consequence, now that there is competition between parties within the
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network, both the Vlaams Belang and the N-VA have made an effort to transition away from
racialized discourse and move towards the ideological center. They are both trying to dance the
same dance of talking about the failure of multiculturalism and the necessity of more restrictive
immigration policy without appearing racist.

Ad campaign of Vlaams Belang,

Party program of the N-VA, 2007

2011

Translation: For a long time migration and integration were politically
incorrect subject matters best not to talk about. However the problems
piled up in the absence of a real policy. The N-VA wants to provide
answers to questions and problems. A positive response. 26

Figure 5.2 Overt and Subtle Racist Imagery of the Belgian Far-Right

Just as some of the VB leadership has tried to distance itself from the overt racism of Filip
Dewinter, the N-VA has tried to move away from imagery and speech that carries any
implications of an immigrant group’s ethnic inferiority. In 2007, the N-VA presented itself as
26

NVA. Programma Federale Verkiezingen. 2007, p. 25.
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organization that was going to save Belgium from all the politically correct liberals who were too
afraid to admit that immigration was a problem (see translation above). Presently, the N-VA,
like party chairman Van Grieken of the Vlaams Belang, is framing its advocacy for stricter
immigration policy in an “immigrant-friendly way.” For example, in their official standpoint on
immigration, they begin by acknowledging that immigrants who “come here to work or study,
make an active contribution to society.” In addition, rather than saying that a more restrictive
asylum and family reunification policy is in the best interest of the Flemish, they suggest that it is
also in the best interest of the immigrants themselves, saying “unfortunately,” when “too many
migrants enter the country through a passive immigration policy (asylum, family unification, or
regularization)… too often people end up in unemployment.” Similarly, instead of
incorporating imagery—like the two baby chicks--that thinly veils their preference for racial
exclusion, the N-VA has chosen images that portray immigrants in a more positive light.

Figure 5.3 The "Immigrant-Friendly" Imagery of the N-VA27
It is no longer true that the Vlaams Belang is on the ideological fringe while the N-VA is closer
to the moderate center. When it comes to a racist discourse surrounding immigration, both
27

Image available at N-VA Standpoints: Migration. 2015.
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parties are converging towards the center and striving to adopt more “immigrant-friendly”
rhetoric. Tom Van Grieken is no Filip de Winter. He was chosen as the new lead of VB because
he has a more “modern” perspective. Van Grieken’s rhetoric would fit comfortably within the
N-VA and, in fact, he was even courted by the N-VA, but declined to change parties. In fact,
due to the unpopularity of racist rhetoric and imagery, the discourse of both parties is converging
towards the center and the language of both parties has the appearance of being more
accommodating of immigrants and their best interest. As the Vlaams Belang moves away from
the ideological fringe and towards the ideological center, the N-VA may lose its competitive
edge over the Vlaams Belang.
5.2.5

The VB Softens its Racist Image

The VB has been on the ideological fringe of the Flemish nationalist network because of its
racist rhetoric. However, the Vlaams Belang has been engaging in efforts to soften its racist
image and move closer to the ideological center of the network in order to regain a competitive
edge over the N-VA. Controversial frontman Filip Dewinter has been replaced by a younger and
more rhetorically moderate Tom Van Grieken. In contrast to Dewinter, who coined the slogan
“A Flemish Flanders in a White Europe” under the Vlaams Blok, Van Grieken claims that he
“does not want to decide who is Flemish and who is not. If someone says they are Flemish, I
will not say they are not.”28 Where Dewinter openly embraces Islamophobia, Van Grieken is
more likely to frame his anti-immigration stance in a humanitarian way. For example, he
suggests that, by promoting economic migration, the N-VA is actually perpetuating the
disempowerment of the developing world:
What they think is that immigration is fine for labor…what we think is that immigration for labor creates a
brain drain from developing countries and if this continues, the gap between them will never close...N-VA

28

Interview conducted with Tom Van Grieken, June 2014.
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is happy for immigrants to work the jobs that Belgians do not want…I think it is cruel because it says that
some jobs are more important than others.29

Thus Van Grieken seems to say that immigration restriction is actually in the best interest
of the immigrants and of their home countries. It is clear that it is important to Van Grieken for
the VB not to be perceived as a racist party. He suggested that the reason that the VB lost so
many votes to the N-VA in 2014 was because of “miscommunications.” Similarly, one
supporter of N-VA noted that there were people within the VB who wanted to change its image,
but “then there are people like Filip de Winter who mess it up again.”30 Van Grieken tries to
rectify de Winter’s “miscommunications” so that potential voters can see the VB in a new light.
Van Grieken believes that, despite the poor performance in 2014, the Vlaams Belang is one its
way back and that the “communication and packaging have changed, but the contents not at all”
(Van Grieken 2015b). One illustration of this new communication strategy was made evident
via Twitter when former party leader Filip de Winter publicly embraced the label “racist,” Gerolf
Annemans and Tom Van Grieken were quick to respond:
Gerolf Annemans@gannemans : @FDW_VB: Sorry. Disagree. Abuse of words is for the leftists. It was
not me. It’s not me. I will never be #racisme.
Tom Van Grieken: Racism has become so eroded and abused term that Dewinter and Annemans did not
know. :D. 31

In an unusual twist, rather than embracing racism, Van Grieken suggests that the Flemish racism
is in part responsible for the Islamization of Flanders. He expresses his disappointment with the
sacrifices that are being made to accommodate the Muslim population, specifically “separate
swimming [pools], paying for halal meat in the schools and imam training” all paid for by the
Belgian taxpayers; however he feels that, in the absence of racism, these accommodations would
29

Ibid.
Interview with far-right party member 5, June 2014.
31
The full text of the Twitter conservation between and Annemans is available at “Dewinter en Annemans Ruzien
op Twitter over Racisme” De Redactie, 1 March, 2015.
30
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not be necessary. He suggests that, under the current system, “Both are under attack and it is
because of our racism and our intolerance” (Van Grieken 2015). Van Grieken has not
substantially altered the policies of the Vlaams Belang and continues to support strict asylum
policies, immigrant repatriation, and the necessity of immigrants assimilating to Flemish culture,
but by scrubbing away the racist rhetoric surrounding these policy preferences, Van Grieken may
be able to legitimize the party in the eyes of the Flemish public.
5.2.6

The Loyalists

The N-VA is a strong niche competitor of the Vlaams Belang; however there are some Vlaams
Belang hardliners who are unlikely to shift their loyalties. The loyalists are those most dedicated
to the party and include party officials (particularly those who have been with the party since the
1970s), unreconstructed fascists, and members of extremist paramilitary organizations. Their
viewpoints are more radical than those of the broader Flemish nationalist movement and they
believe the N-VA is not aggressive enough in its efforts to achieve Flemish independence and
restrict immigration. The loyalists are also regionally defined to some extent. The Vlaams
Belang built itself from the municipal level up, using Antwerp as a foundation and then
broadening its appeal throughout Flanders. There is evidence that the Vlaams Belang still enjoys
support in Antwerp, particularly from the local chapter of NSV-a nationalist student
organization- and the neofascist paramilitary organization, Voorpost. It is telling that, on the
celebration of an important holiday in the Flemish community, July 11th, the N-VA held its
celebration in Brussels while the VB celebrated in Antwerp. July 11th is the Day of the Flemish
Community, held to commemorate the Goldensporenslagen (Battle of the Golden Spurs)
between French and Flemish forces in 1302. The narrative surrounding this battle has played a
vital role in the construction of Flemish nationalism, as it focuses on the oppression of the
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Flemish people by the French and on their ability to overcome that oppression (Rutten et al.
2010). The N-VA celebrated the day in Brussels, accompanied by the Young N-VA and KVHVAntwerp (Jong N-VA 2014). The party was held at the Vlaams Huis (Flanders House), which is
the headquarters of the Flemish nationalist movement in Brussels. The Vlaams Huis is a sort of
neutral ground for supporters of Flemish nationalism and politicians and activists from the farright, the far left, and every position in between regularly attend meetings or meet for drinks
there after work.
The Vlaams Belang did not advertise the meeting at the Vlaams Huis and instead,
focused on the July 11th celebration happening in Antwerp. At this celebration, one was more
likely to see the organizations that remain loyal to the VB, including members of Voorpost and
NSV- Antwerp. The event was held in a small square, Hendrik Conscienceplein, a site with
symbolic significance because it is named in honor of Hendrik Conscience, Flemish nationalist
and author of De Leeuw Van Vlaanderen (1838), a romanticized account of the Flemish victory
over the French at the Battle of the Golden Spurs. Key members of the Vlaams Belang were in
attendance, including Filip de Winter and Tom Van Grieken. Traditional Flemish music was
played, free beer was served, and, towards the end of the event, members of the NSV gathered
together and sang songs from the Studentencodex. At the end of the celebration, many of the
remaining participants headed over to the bar, De Leeuw van Vlaanderen (The Lion of
Flanders), to continue drinking and singing Flemish nationalist songs. Tom Van Grieken went
home, but Filip De Winter and many members of Voorpost and the NSV Antwerp were still in
attendance.
The Leeuw van Vlaanderen is a headquarters for radical Flemish nationalists. The bar
was frequented by those who collaborated with the Nazis during World War II and the walls are
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plastered with years of Flemish propaganda and pictures of Flemish nationalist heroes. It was
established in honor of Herman Van Den Reeck, a Flemish martyr who was shot by the police
during a July 11th protest in 1920. It is presently used as a headquarters for the NSV-Antwerp,
which routinely holds meetings and initiations there. The fraternal aspects of NSV-Antwerp are
key to perpetuating member loyalty to the Flemish nationalist movement and to Vlaams Belang
in particular. One observer described it thus:
The drunken kids we saw that night were the same people manning tables, collecting forms, serving food,
and doing the grunt work at the Day of the Right Wing Youth. Within a few years, they will be running
conferences and winning public office. No youth political organization in America comes close to their
dedication, activism, or enthusiasm….The VB keenly understands the importance of the subculture.
Political movements are built on volunteer politics: Every minute spent for the cause is a minute taken
away from work, family, or friends. It is therefore extremely important that political work be combined as
much as possible with fun and friendship. As one party member confided to me, “The movement would not
be where it is if it were not for drinking. 32

The night I was in attendance, young supporters of the Vlaams Belang were manning a booth in
the alley, distributing stickers, key chains, and party publications, including a newly published
comic book detailing the many ways in which immigrants are destroying the city of Antwerp
(robbing banks, urinating on the streets, etc.) I was told by one of the members not to carry the
bag of paraphernalia down the street because if would not be safe.

I had several casual

conversations with members of NSV-Antwerp, who felt some solidarity with me when they
learned I was an American because “immigrants are destroying America too.” Throughout the
evening, Filip de Winter was surrounded by members of Voorpost-some of the more visually
identifiable neo-fascists due to their skinhead aesthetic-who acted as a security during the main
event and at the bar afterwards.

32

For those interested in the role of youth movements and bars in the Flemish radical network, the full text of this
observation of the Leeuwe van Vlaanderen is available at “A Visit to the De Leeuw van Vlaanderen, 29 August,
2014. Available at http://shittyguide.org/visit-de-leeuw-van-vlaanderen/.
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Interpersonal ties in social networks tend to be the stronger then ties that are forged
online. In addition, ties become stronger with greater frequency of contact and the development
of friendship (Granovetter 1973). Bars like the De Leeuwe van Vlaanderen and student
organizations like the NSV provide a venue for frequent contact and – aided by the alcohol – the
opportunity for friendships to develop. One representative of the student organization, KVHV,
noted that the organization does not really use social media to recruit to a significant decree
saying that “we barely use that” and that most members join because a friend invited them to a
bar during a recruitment week.33 The bonds forged in youth, through student organizations like
the NSV tend to have lasting power. Vlaams Belang party leader Tom Van Grieken himself
came up through the NSV and was president of the organization prior to serving as an official for
the Vlaams Belang. It is evident that he feels a strong sense of loyalty to the party and, despite
being courted by the N-VA—the most powerful party in the country—he chose to stay with the
Vlaams Belang. Van Grieken fondly recounted his initial entry into the party:
My first membership card was VB…I was raised in a multicultural neighborhood, multicultural
schools…around 15 I started looking for my identity…and identified myself as Flemish and there are only
so many parties who believe in Flemish independence and I believe in Flemish independence.34

5.2.7

The Swingers

The strong degree of niche overlap between N-VA and VB makes it easy for members to switch
from one to the other. One can change parties without disengaging from their existing social
networks or abandoning their commitment to Flemish nationalism. For example, former Vlaams
Belang official Francis Van den Eynde announced that he was planning on voting for some NVA candidates in 2014, particularly Gertrude Vercaemer, the daughter of one of his friends and
colleagues. He made it clear that his departure from the VB was amicable and that he is “still

33
34

Interview with member of far-right student organization 4, June 2014.
Interview with Tom Van Grieken, June 2014.
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faithful to [his] Flemish nationalist conviction” (Van den Eynde 2012). Similarly, one young NVA supporter came from a family that was friends with Filip de Winter and typically voted for
Vlaams Belang. However, he noted that he voted for N-VA because it is the smarter option
since it was less extreme in its posture towards immigration and Flemish independence.
Specifically he noted that, while he wants an independent Flanders, “a revolution is not the good
way…it’s probably easier to try confederalism.”35
One of the oldest and most well established organizations in the Flemish nationalist
network is the VVB, and while it is officially nonpartisan, there is some evidence to suggest that
the organization has stronger ties to the N-VA than it ever did to the Vlaams Belang. Key party
leaders like Jan Jambon and Geert Bourgeois were members of the VVB prior to joining N-VA.
One member noted, “in the past, we had difficulties with the Vlaams Belang. And now with the
N-VA, they are moderate with some issues and that opens some doors.”36 Similarly, another
member noted, while the Vlaams Belang did a lot to popularize the Flemish nationalist agenda,
the movement is presently in better hands with the N-VA in power:
For many years the VVB was considered a marginal element in society….since N-VA is
so big, it is impossible for the media not to acknowledge them. It makes also, our point
of view to be considered more important than it was 10 years ago. And of course, well,
the party grows and the media are more open to our points of view and more people
can be reached and the message can be integrated by more people.37

The Flemish nationalist student organizations, Katholiek Vlaams Hoogstudentenverbond
(Catholic Flemish Student’s Union, KVHV) and NSV, are also officially nonpartisan; however
the former has a tendency to be more moderate while the latter is more radical. The Vlaams
Belang has an official youth branch, the Vlaams Belang Jongeren (Flemish Interest Youth, VBJ)

35

Interview with member of far-right student organization 6, June 2014.
Interview with member of Flemish separatist organization 1, June 2014.
37
Interview with member of Flemish separatist organization 2, June 2014.
36
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yet the NSV has also acted as an unofficial feeder organization for the party. Several party
officials including Tom Van Grieken, Karim van Overmier, Frank Vanhecke, and Philip Claeys,
were members of the NSV during university. Van Grieken notes that the NSV are “close to us,”
but “really independent” and noted that his present involvement with the organization did not
really go beyond paying the tab for their beer.38 The strength of the ties between the Vlaams
Belang and the NSV seem to vary geographically. The NSV Antwerp chapter, while smaller
than when the VB was in its heyday, remains fairly loyal to the party, while the chapters in other
cities have shifted their loyalties to the N-VA. Johan Deckman, representative of the VB in
Ghent, noted that it was increasingly difficult to get support for VB events from the local NSV
chapter. The organization did not host any representatives from the Vlaams Belang from 2012 to
2014 apart from Francis Van den Eynde, who left the Vlaams Belang and presently supports the
N-VA. However, the organization did host an event with Tom Van Grieken with 30 NSV
members in attendance, so the loyalty of the organization may again shift back to VB.
5.3

The Vlaams Belang is not Dead Yet

Many are quick to proclaim the death of a political party, however, any pronouncements of a
funeral for the Vlaams Belang are premature. Sometimes when a party appears dead, it is merely
dormant, and poising itself for a resurgence years down the road. It may be particularly
appealing for the media to portray a far-right party as dead because it suggests that democracy
has triumphed. I suggest that the Vlaams Belang will follow a trajectory similar to France’s
Front National, a party everyone thought had died when Jean-Marie Le Pen stepped down as a
leader, only to experience a resurgence under the leadership of his daughter, Marine. Marine Le

38

Interview with Tom Van Grieken, July 2014.
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Pen was well aware of the fact that the FN has been written off by the public and, in particular,
the media:
For the last two years we have been buried. The media and political analysts have
overseen a burial ceremony. They have laid out the wreaths and said, we’re done with
the National Front, and I must say that many of them added ‘good riddance.’ (Le Pen 2010).

Marine Le Pen promised that the Front National was not dead, but evolving, and she was right.
The party toned down some of its racist rhetoric-just like the Vlaams Belang is trying to do-and
performed well in the 2012 elections, earning 13.6% of the vote in the National Assembly, while
Le Pen earned nearly 18% of the votes in the first round of the Presidential Election.
Many have claimed that the Vlaams Belang is a dying party and that the election of 2014
was the nail in its coffin. Right now the N-VA is the most popular party in the country and it has
a competitive edge over the Vlaams Belang; however this is subject to change. The fact that
many current voters of the N-VA once supported Vlaams Belang suggests their party loyalty is
not deep rooted and they could easily make the switch back if circumstances change. One
Vlaams Belang party member noted that, the entire Flemish Movement vacillates over time in its
political leanings. He noted that, while the Flemish Movement (VVB) is a nonpartisan
movement, the dominant factions within it can change over time from moderate to radical. He
predicted that many members of the VVB would “get more radical again because they see that
the N-VA is not working.” 39
The primary advantage the N-VA has over the VB is not appearing racist, but if, with the
passing of the torch from De Winter to Van Grieken, the VB can downplay its racist image, it
may regain a competitive edge over the N-VA. This new and improved Vlaams Belang could be
appealing to those who feel that the N-VA has made too many compromises regarding the
39

Interview with far-right party member 3, June 2014.
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Flemish nationalist agenda. Jan Beyers, Professor of Political Science at the University of
Antwerp predicted that, by hijacking the agenda of the Vlaams Belang and occupying the same
competitive niche, the N-VA was putting itself in a risk position, saying:
There is no doubt about that. In the long run, I think this will be a problem for the party. Right now, all is
going well. They will have to make compromises, make unpopular policies, so on so forth…and then that
will be the critical defining moment. Winning elections is fun, but surviving a crisis is a bit more salient.
Their problem is that they have become more conservative, more right wing, but it has not become a radical
right wing party or anti-immigrant party, but they have a constituency that has been socialized in this way
40
of thinking. How will they serve them?

There is some evidence to suggest that some who voted for the N-VA in 2014 are
disappointed with the party’s performance. A representative from the VVB noted that
organization was happy a Flemish nationalist party was governing, but that they were “deeply
disappointed” that there were not more pro-Flemish policies on the agenda. 41 Polls conducted in
a year after the party’s victory in 2014 reveal that, while N-VA is still the largest party in
Flanders, its popularity is decreasing by roughly 4% while the Vlaams Belang’s popularity is
increasing by 2.2%.42 While it is too soon to say that the Vlaams Belang is making a comeback,
it is fair to say that, with 8% of the public saying they would vote for the party in the next
election, the party is not dead. Ultimately, this suggests that, contrary to conventional wisdom, it
can be positive for a far-right political party to have strong support from extremist movements.
These extremists can provide a loyal support base that makes the party less vulnerable to niche
competition. When faced with a viable niche competitor, like the N-VA, the moderates in the
organization may shift their support, however the loyalists will remain and prevent the death of
the party.
40

Interview with Jan Beyers, June 23, 2014.
The full text of the interview with the representative is available at “Vlaamse Volksbeweging ontgoocheld
wegens to weinig ‘Vlaams.’ 24 July, 2014. Available at
http://www.hln.be/hln/nl/17781/Regeringsvorming/article/detail/1956350/2014/07/24/Vlaamse-Volksbewegingontgoocheld-wegens-te-weinig-Vlaams.dhtml.
42
For the full results of the poll, see “NVA Verliest in Peiling, maar blijft Grootste Partij.” Gazet van Antwerpeni, 29
April, 2015.
41
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5.4

Competition in the Walloon Far-Right Network
In contrast to the Vlaams Belang and the N-VA, the Belgian FN does not occupy a

central position within the Belgian far right network. In addition, unlike the Flemish nationalist
party, it was not built on the foundations of a strong nationalist subculture. In contrast to
Flanders, there is not a strong tradition of nationalism in Walloonia, which made it relatively
difficult for the FN to build a large support base from the outset. While there were far right
organizations that predated the FN, like the anti-immigrant Front de la Jeunesse (Youth Front –
FJ) these movements faded out and were never electorally successful (Delwitt 2006:144-145).
The FN is isolated in the broader Belgian far right network and fails to occupy a central
position within the Francophone far right network. The Walloon far right network is
decentralized, with no actor occupying a central position and a multitude of organizations
competing with one another including the Jeunes Populaires (Popular Youth,UMP), and
Democratie National (National Democrats, DNN). Many of these groups are a flash in the pan,
do not have a strong on or offline presence, and do not regularly contest elections. However,
their existence prevents the FN from becoming a more powerful actor within the network. Since
its foundation, the Belgian FN has always had to deal with factionalism and competition with
other actors in the Walloon far right community.
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Figure 5.4 The Four Pillars of the Extreme Right in Belgium
The National Front has proven unable to occupy a central position within the network in
part because of its inability to sustain significant relationships with other actors in the Walloon
far right. The Belgian National Front emerged in the 1980s under the leadership of Daniel Féret.
The party has been plagued with factionalism from the outset and many blame Féret for the
inability of the FN to build the relationships necessary to sustain the party. For example, one
former FN party member noted “He wants to run the whole show…he continues to block the
expansion of the FN by keeping alive perpetual disputes with deputies” (Delwit 2006: 148).
Similarly, former FN member Gilsain Dubois blames Féret for FN’s failures:
I think that Mr. Féret is now paying the consequences of his actions…his policy was to surround himself
with mediocre [people] to better hold his control…Because he is more of a guru than a party leader…and to
eject the men and women of quality for fear that they will make him pale in comparison (DuBois 2007).

While there have been temporary efforts to unify the Walloon far right around a central actor,
these efforts have never enjoyed any long term success. Denault notes:
The far right in Wallonia, while significant has never enjoyed the same success as its cousins in
Flanders. This is in part because the party is split into factions: FN, Le Front Nouveau de Belgique (The
New Belgian Front, ETF), and the Front Democratique Belge (Belgian Democratic Front) (Denault 2001:
205-208).
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The New Belgian Front or ETF sees itself as the true National Front and claims a relationship
with the original National Front founded by Jean-Marie Le Pen. On its website it states:
To our regret, we are obliged to attack directly and openly Daniel Féret…who has arbitrarily appropriated
the name and logo of a major French party founded by Jean-Marie Le Pen…There is no alternative other
than to attack and denounce the false FN in order to differentiate ourselves…It is important [to]…make the
difference between the FN and the ETF. This is a risky and dangerous operation, but we have no choice
(ETF 2003).

Another faction that emerged was created by former FN member Dutraux Francis, Wallonie
D’Abord (Wallonia First), who wanted to distance himself from the more extremist actors in the
FN (Rocour 2012). There is not a significant overlap in followers of Wallonie D’Abord and the
FN, suggesting that the problem is not niche competition, but factionalism.
The inability for the FN to become a central actor in the Walloonia cannot be blamed
solely on Féret, because the factionalism has continued even with the emergence of a new party
leader. The FN presently operates under the name Democratie Nationale (National Democrats,
DN) because the French FN no longer wants the party to use its name. The party is presently
under the leadership of Marco Santi, who has also found it difficult to build a unified movement.
Santi, finding it difficult to build relationships with the Walloon far right, has made efforts to
boost the party’s relationship with Flemish and international far right organizations. For
example, Santi met with Filip Dewinter of the Vlaams Belang and President Bashar-al Assad of
Syria to discuss the defense of Christians against Muslim extremism” (Santi 2015).
It is difficult to make a concrete evaluation of the Walloon far right network due to the
temporary nature of their organizations, a lack of a strong on and offline presence, and an
inability to conduct systematic interviews with party members. However, the evidence in this
study and the limited scholarly and journalistic work on the Belgian Francophone far right
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suggest that no single Francophone far right party occupies a central position on the national or
regional level.
5.5

Chapter Summary

An analysis of the Flemish far-right network suggests the, while the Vlaams Belang does occupy
a central position within the network, the N-VA has emerged as a niche competitor, coopting
many former supports of the Vlaams Belang. As a consequence, the Vlaams Belang, which once
occupied a more peripheral position in the network ideologically due its overtly Islamophobic
discourse, is now moderating its rhetoric to match that of the N-VA in an effort to move towards
the ideological center and increase its support base. While some have predicted the death of the
Vlaams Belang, it is possible that, with the moderation of its rhetoric, the Vlaams Belang could
recapture some of the support it lost to the N-VA.
While it is difficult to make conclusions about the far right in Walloonia due to the
limited available information about these organizations, the evidence suggests that there is no
actor in the Walloon far right that occupies a central position in the network, on a national or a
regional level. As a consequence, Francophone far right parties, like the FN, have always had to
deal with rival factions and none has been able to sustain any long-term electoral success.
6
6.1

CONCLUSION

Significant Findings

In order to truly understand far-right parties, it is important to understand the families they come
from. Far-right parties do not exist in isolation. They are built from and sustained by the
relationships they have with other extremist actors. When a far-right party occupies a central
position in the broader extremist network, it has a greater ability to recruit members, publicize
events, and spread its ideological message. Belgium is an ideal case study for trying to
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understand the role networks play in party building as it has three far-right parties operating
under the same macroeconomic conditions and electoral system. The findings suggest that a
party’s position within the broader far-right network shapes the trajectory it takes. The Belgian
Vlaams Belang has benefitted from the dense ties it has with other organizations in the Flemish
Nationalist network. Similarly, the French Front National and UKIP in the UK are the most
central actors and most sustainable parties in their respective far-right networks, suggesting there
is a positive relationship between network centrality and party sustainability.
The findings in regards to ideological centrality and party sustainability are less
conclusive. Overall, nationalist discourse appears to be dominant in the Belgian network and
Islamophobic discourse is relatively on the fringe. The methods used to identify dominant
discursive patterns in the network as a whole are imperfect and further research, including the
construction of a corpus that is representative of the entirety of far-right discourse is necessary in
order to more accurately identify discursive trends. However, corpus analyses of the individual
Belgian far-right parties do reveal some important trends. The FN is the party that is most likely
to use Islamophobic discourse and it is also the weakest party in the network. Similarly, the
evidence suggests that parties, like the N-VA, that focus on immigration restriction and
improving law and order without incorporating racist or Islamophobic rhetoric, are more
sustainable. In addition, there is evidence that the ideological platforms of the Vlaams Belang
and the N-VA are converging, with the former using less Islamophobic rhetoric in an effort to
move closer towards the ideological center.
The findings from this study suggest that far-right parties can be undermined by
competition from within. In Belgium, the N-VA emerged from within the Flemish nationalist
network as a niche competitor of the Vlaams Belang, mimicking its ideological platform and

120

capturing many of its voters. Similarly, in the UK, UKIP has emerged as a niche competitor for
the BNP in the British far-right network. These finding suggest that, in countries with multiple
far-right parties, scholars should pay attention not only to the ways in which center right parties
compete with the far-right for votes, but also the ways in which far-right parties compete
amongst themselves.
6.2

Implications
6.2.1

Countering Extremism

Far-right parties and their affiliate organizations pose a significant threat to public safety. In the
United States, the Police Executive Research Forum reported that 74% of terrorist threats were
from far-right extremists relative to 39% from Islamic fundamentalist groups like Al Qaeda
(Kurzman and Schanzer 2015). In Greece, members of the Golden Dawn conduct raids in
immigrant neighborhoods, beating up immigrants with impunity. In Hungary, the paramilitary
organization, the Hungarian Guard, systematically engages in acts of violence against the Roma
community. In Sweden in January 2016, there was an upsurge in far-right violence as the neofascist Swedish Resistance Movement called for attacks on immigrants to avenge the death of a
social worker at refugee center. The Belgian paramilitary organization, Voorpost, has witnessed
an increase in support in the aftermath of the 2016 Brussels attacks, and is currently being
monitoring by Belgian security organizations as a threat to domestic security.
Despite the security risk posed by far-right extremist organizations, much of the attention
of the public, scholars, and law enforcement has been focused on the threat posed by Islamic
fundamentalism. This lack of understanding and resources devoted to the far-right makes it
difficult to counter the threat they pose effectively. In addition, exclusively focusing on Islamic
fundamentalist networks neglects the environment in which Islamic fundamentalists are living.
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Islamic fundamentalists in Belgium, like those involved in the Paris and Brussels attacks in 2015
and 2016, are interacting with and responding to, the legislation, rhetoric, and policies of the
Belgian far-right. In order to understand and counter terrorism, whether it be far-right or Islamic
fundamentalist, it is important to understand the organizational structure of the far-right in the
region.
Both states and non-governmental organizations that are interested in countering
extremist violence need surveillance tools that provide them with information about broader
tactical and ideological trends within extremist networks. This data could be useful in helping to
identify individuals or groups who pose a security threat. In addition, network analysis is
important to helping law enforcement and policymakers understand the radicalization process.
For example, through network analysis, it becomes clear that individuals who engage in terrorist
attacks as “lone wolves” are frequently not operating in isolation, and have often become
radicalized through engagement with other extremist actors, both on and offline (Deland 2014).
Similarly, if one wants to limit the threat posed to the quality of democracy by far-right
parties, it is important to appreciate that far-right parties do not exist in isolation. Policies like
party bans and cordon sanitaires that focus on excluding one single party from them political
process may not be effective as a mechanism of countering extremism if the broader far-right
network is still intact. Far-right parties, like the Vlaams Blok, that are part of a vibrant network
can survive despite a ban because of the dense connections they have with other actors in the
network. In the case of the Vlaams Blok, the party merely reconstituted itself as the Vlaams
Belang, relying on organizations like Voorpost for recruitment. Similarly, when the Czech
Worker’s Party was banned, it relied on hooligan sites to organize its meetings covertly.

122

6.2.2

The Sustainability of the Vlaams Belang and the French National Front

The Belgian Vlaams Belang and the French National Front occupy a central position in their
respective far-right networks. As a consequence, they have been two of the most successful farright parties in Europe. While the National Front has publicly sought to distance itself from the
radical fringe in an effort to boost its popularity, the group is defended by the Department for
Protection and Security (DPS), which draws many of its members from the violent neo-fascist
student organization Groupe Union Defense. This is parallel to the role Voorpost has played in
providing “security” for the Vlaams Belang. Regardless of whether or not a party publicly
acknowledges its ties to actors on the radical fringe, these ties exist and help to sustain the party.
Just as people predicted the death of the French National Front, they predicted the death
of the Vlaams Belang. However, both parties, because of their strong relationships with other
far-right organizations, have proven that they are capable of rebuilding after a loss. The National
Front performed well in first round of the 2015 general elections, earning 30% of the overall
national vote (Werly 2015). Similarly, in the aftermath of the 2016 Brussels attacks, support for
the Vlaams Belang has surged and its Facebook likes have increased 3,000%. Party leader Tom
Van Grieken reported that the party gained 10,000 new likes overnight.
6.2.3

Trump, the Tea Party, and the Far-Right in the US

According to the American Values Survey, the number of Americans who identify as part of the
Tea Party has declined from 11 in 2010 to 6 percent in 2015 (Wilkinson 2015). It is possible
that, just as the N-VA was able to mimic aspects of the Vlaams Belang’s ideological platform to
capture votes, Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump was able to mimic aspects of the
Tea Party platform to capture votes. Conservative commentator Glenn Beck noted that those
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Tea Partiers who abandoned Tea Party candidates to support Trump did so because of his use of
racist rhetoric:
I don’t think these are Tea Party people who are following [Trump],” Beck said. “Some
of them may be, but I think these — I mean, you can’t — if you were a Tea Party person,
then you were lying. You were lying. It was about Barack Obama being black. It was
about him being a Democrat, because this guy is offering you many of the same things, as
shallow as the same way (Beck 2015).
In addition, Donald Trump has attracted the support of far-right white supremacist groups
including the Ku Klux Kian and the American Freedom Party. Jared Taylor and members of the
white supremacist New Century Foundations have made robocalls on Trump’s behalf (Mahler
2016). While Trump has (belatedly) distanced himself from these organizations and has no
official ties with white supremacist organizations, by attending Trump’s rallies and diffusing his
policy platforms through social media, white supremacist groups are proving to be an asset to
Trump’s campaign. While one might assume that any affiliation with white supremacist groups
would be political suicide, this is based on a naïve assumption that white supremacy is
pathological in liberal democracies. In reality, in Belgium and in the United States, the belief in
white supremacy is more prevalent than people care to admit. As Cas Mudde has noted, “far
from being an aberration, the attitudes and ideological features of the radical right are fairly
widespread,” in contemporary liberal democracies (2010: 1167). Therefore, it is possible for farright politicians to perform well, even if they have ties to white supremacist or neo-fascist
organizations.’
6.3

Limitations
6.3.1

Temporal Dimension

This study mapped the Belgian far-right social network at a moment in time and this map
provided key insights into patterns of cooperation and contestation in the network. However,
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social networks are dynamic. While many acknowledge the dynamism of networks as
“individuals join, participate, attract, compete, cooperate, and disappear,” this study and many
others fail to capture this dynamism (Santoro et al.: 1). While a structural analysis is valuable,
the value would be enhanced if one were able to see how the organizational structure of the farright changes over time. This temporal analysis would also help to establish a causal mechanism
behind the theory advanced in this study. For instance, while it is clear that the N-VA emerged
as a niche competitor of the Vlaams Belang in the far-right network, it is unclear what sequence
of events enabled it to occupy this position. Did the N-VA’s capture of Vlaams Belang’s
ideology help it occupy a more central position within the network? Why did the N-VA emerge
as a niche competitor when it did? These questions, while not addressed by this study, would be
easier to address with a dynamic rather than a static analysis of social networks.
6.3.2

Explaining the Emergence of Niche Competitors

While this study provides substantial evidence that far-right parties can become vulnerable to
niche competitors, it does not explain why niche competitors emerge. It is possible that a niche
competitor emerges when a party becomes either more or less extreme than its support base. For
example, the Vlaams Belang was arguably more radical than many in the broader Flemish
nationalist movement, making it vulnerable to the rise of niche competitor with slightly less
radical ideology. Yet, the Vlaams Belang had performed well, despite the overly racist rhetoric
of its party leader until 2010. In fact, one could argue that the N-VA would never have been able
to be successful without Vlaams Belang paving the way for public acceptance of its ideological
platform. A dynamic analysis of social networks would illuminate factors that lead to the
emergence of a niche competitor, as one could observe the structure of the network before,
during, and after the competitor’s emergence.
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6.4

Avenues for Further Research
6.4.1

The Far-Left

Scholars and policymakers are beginning to appreciate the use of social network analysis to
enhance our understanding of the far-right; however little attention has been paid to the social
networks of the far-left. Far-left organizations, like far-right organizations, can pose a threat to
security. Frequently far left and far-right organizations will antagonize one another, which leads
to altercations that sometimes become violent. While it is counterintuitive, anecdotal evidence
suggests that a vibrant far-left network may strengthen far-right organizations. For example, in
Germany, the members of militant far-left organizations have engaged in acts of violence at farright rallies and set cars of neo-Nazis on fire. Yet their attendance at far-right rallies seems to
add fuel to the fire and helps perpetuates the far-right’s sense of purpose. Similarly, the presence
of Black Lives Matter Protestors at a Trump rally, may strengthen, rather than weaken Trump’s
appeal amongst his support base (Robbins 2016). Viola Neu, an expert on political extremism,
notes that the far-left and far-right “legitimize each other” (Wroe 2010). A social network
analysis that incorporated both far-left and far-right parties would help to establish whether or
not it is beneficial or detrimental to the far-right to interact with far left organizations.

6.4.2

Islamic Fundamentalist Networks

Much of the scholarly and policymaking emphasis in the study of online extremism has focused
on Islamic extremist networks; however little attention has been paid to the ways in which
Islamic extremist groups and far-right groups interact with one another. In the aftermath of 9/11,
the London bombing of 2005, the November 2015 Paris attacks, the 2016 attack in Brussels,
governmental organizations, police forces, and academics have sought to enhance their
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understanding of terrorist networks in order to more effectively counter extremism. However,
many of these studies focus solely on the terrorist organizations and fail to appreciate the ways in
which these organizations interact with and respond to the environment in which they are
embedded (Klausen 2015; Koschade 2006; Ressler 2006). Specifically, far-right organizations
can antagonize Muslim immigrant communities and advocate for policies that exacerbate their
sense of exclusion. Having lived in a predominantly immigrant neighborhood during my field
research in Antwerp, I witnessed firsthand the ways in which far-right organizations established
their offices in the heart of immigrant neighborhoods. I witnessed firsthand members of the
paramilitary organization physically intimidating young men of color when they tried to walk
past the local Flemish nationalist bar. In addition, I watched neighborhood vandalize the signs
and offices of far-right parties. Based on these observations, it appeared to me that the
interactions between the far-right and immigrant communities could provide insight into the
radicalization process. Rather than looking at the far-right or Islamic fundamentalist networks in
isolation, it may be helpful to examine the ways in which these networks interact both on and
offline.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Recruitment Email

Dear [insert name],
We are writing to invite you to participate in our research study about the social networks of
nationalist organizations in Belgium. The purpose of the study is to understand how relationships
between these organizations impact their longevity. You're eligible to be in this study because you are a
member of [insert name of organization]. Your contact information was obtained from your
organization’s website.
If you are interested in participating in this research, you will be asked to participate in an
interview. The interview will take approximately one hour of your time and will take place in a
location of your choice.
Participation in this study is voluntary. You can choose to be in the study or not. If you would
like to participate or have any questions about the study, please email me at
sjones104@student.gsu.edu.
Thank you very much.
Sincerely,

Dr. Jelena Subotic
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
Georgia State University
Email: jsubotic@gsu.edu
Mobile: +1 404-413-6173

Shannon Jones
Doctoral Candidate
Department of Political Science
Georgia State University
Email: sjones104@student.gsu.edu
Mobile: +1 770-634-3156
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Appendix B: Informed Consent
Georgia State University
Department of Political Science
Informed Consent
Title: Mapping Extremism: Network Politics and the Far-right in Europe
Principal Investigator: Shannon Jones
Purpose:
You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of the study is to investigate the
organizational structure of nationalist networks. You are invited to participate because you are a
member of one of the organizations within this network. Participation will require 30 to 40
minutes of your time.
II.

Procedures:

If you decide to participate, the principal investigator will conduct an interview with you, posing
a series of questions that will last approximately 30 to 40 minutes. I would like to make a tape
recording of our discussion, so that I can have an accurate record of the information that you
provide to me. I will transcribe that recording by hand, and will keep the transcripts confidential
and securely in my possession. I will erase the tape after I transcribe it.
III.

Risks:

There is a small risk of a breach of confidentiality, but all efforts will be made to keep everything
that you tell me in the strictest confidentiality. Your name will not be linked to anything you say
in the text of my dissertation or any other publications. If you have any additional questions
concerning this research or your participation in it, please feel free to contact me, my dissertation
supervisor or our university research office at any time.
IV.

Benefits:

Participation in this study may or may not benefit you personally. The information you share
with me will be of great value in helping me to complete this research project, the results of
which could significantly enhance our understanding of nationalist mobilization.
V.

Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal:

Participation in research is voluntary. You do not have to be in this study. If you decide to be in
the study and change your mind, you have the right to drop out at any time. You may skip
questions or stop participating at any time. Whatever you decide, you will not lose any benefits
to which you are otherwise entitled.
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VI.

Confidentiality:

We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. My dissertation supervisor, Dr.
Jelena Subotic, will have access to the information you provide. Information may also be shared
with those who make sure the study is done correctly, including GSU Institutional Review Board
and the Office for Human Research Protection (OHRP). We will use a study number rather than
your name on study records. The information you provide will be stored in a password and
firewall-protected computer. The code sheet that will be used to identify research participants
will be stored separately from the data in order to protect privacy. Your name and other facts that
might point to you will not appear when we present this study or publish its results. The findings
will be summarized and reported in group form. You will not be identified personally. The audio
tapes of the recording will be kept in a lockbox prior to transcription, after which they will be
erased.
VII. Contact Persons:
Contact Dr. Jelena Subotic at or jsubotic@gsu.edu if you have questions about this study. If you
have questions or concerns about your rights as a participant in this research study, you may
contact Susan Vogtner in the Office of Research Integrity at 404-413-3513 or
svogtner1@gsu.edu.
VIII.

Copy of Consent Form to Subject:

We will give you a copy of this consent form to keep.
If you are willing to volunteer for this research and be audio recorded, please sign below.
_________________________________________
_______________
Participant
Date
_________________________________________
Principal Investigator or Researcher Obtaining Consent

Appendix C: Informed Consent Script (French)

_______________
Date

139

Georgia State University
Département des sciences politiques
Accord de participation à une étude

Titre :

Cartographie de l’extrémisme : politique en réseau et l’extrême droite en Belgique

Chercheur principal :
Chercheur-étudiant principal :

Dr Jelena Subotic
Shannon Jones

Objet :
Vous êtes invité à participer à une étude. L’objet de l’étude est de comprendre les raisons pour
lesquelles certains partis politiques survivent tandis et d’autres s’éteignent. L’étude est axée sur
les relations entre ces partis et les organisations qui ne sont associées à aucun parti. Vous êtes
invité à participer à l’étude en raison de vos connaissances dans ce domaine. Un total de 40
participants seront recrutés pour cette étude. La participation vous demandera une heure de votre
temps.

II. Procédures :
Si vous acceptez de participer à l’étude, vous serez invité à prendre part à un entretien. Ce
dernier se tiendra où vous le souhaitez. L’entretien vous demandera environ une heure de votre
temps.

III. Risques :
Cette étude n’engendrera aucun risque supplémentaire que lors d’une journée ordinaire.

IV. Avantages :
La participation à cette étude ne vous offre aucun avantage direct. Toutefois, votre participation
pourrait aider d’autres personnes à l’avenir grâce au savoir acquis via l’étude sur l’impact des
réseaux sociaux sur la survie des partis.

V. Participation volontaire et rétraction :
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La participation à l’étude est volontaire. Vous n’êtes pas obligé de participer à cette étude. Si
vous décidez de participer à l’étude et changez d’avis, vous aurez le droit de vous retirer à tout
moment. Vous pourrez passer certaines questions ou mettre fin à votre participation à tout
moment. Quelle que soit votre décision, vous ne perdrez aucun avantage auquel vous avez droit.

VI. Confidentialité :
Nous conserverons le caractère privé de votre dossier, dans la mesure permise par la loi. Le Dr
Jelena Subotic et Shannon Jones auront accès aux données que vous fournirez. Ces données
pourront également être partagées avec les personnes qui garantissent la bonne conduite de
l’étude (Georgia State University Institutional Review Board, l’Office for Human Research
Protection des États-Unis). Les données que vous fournirez seront conservées dans des armoires
verrouillées et dans des fichiers informatiques sécurisés. Les dossiers écrits seront détruits dans
les cinq ans suivant leur collecte.
VII. Personnes de contact :
Si vous avez la moindre question, inquiétude ou plainte au sujet de l’étude, veuillez contacter Dr
Jelena Subotic au +1 404-413-6173 ou via l’adresse jsubotic@gsu.edu ou Shannon Jones au +1
770-634-3156 ou via l’adresse sjones104@student.gsu.edu. Si vous souhaitez parler à quelqu’un
qui ne fait pas partie de l’équipe de recherche, veuillez contacter Susan Vogtner du Bureau
d’intégrité de recherche de la Georgia State University au +1 404-413-3513 ou via l’adresse
svogtner1@gsu.edu. Vous pourrez discuter de vos questions, inquiétudes, donner votre avis et
vos suggestions, obtenir des informations au sujet de l’étude. Vous pouvez également contacter
Susan Vogtner si vous avez la moindre question ou inquiétude concernant vos droits quant à
cette étude.

VIII. Accord oral :
Si vous acceptez de participer à cette étude, veuillez dire « Oui ».

Appendix D: Informed Consent Script (Dutch)
Georgia State University
Afdeling Politicologie
Toestemming om deel te nemen aan een onderzoek

Titel: Het in kaart brengen van extremisme: netwerkpolitiek en extreem rechts in België
Hoofdonderzoeker:
Student hoofdonderzoeker:

Dr. Jelena Subotic
Shannon Jones
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Doel:

U wordt uitgenodigd om aan een onderzoek deel te nemen. Het doel van het onderzoek is te
begrijpen waarom sommige politieke partijen overleven en andere niet. Het onderzoek richt zich
op de banden die deze partijen hebben met niet-partijorganisaties. Wij nodigen u uit om deel te
nemen vanwege uw kennis op dit gebied. Voor dit onderzoek worden in totaal 40 deelnemers
uitgenodigd. De deelname zal ongeveer één uur van uw tijd vragen.

II.

Procedures:

Als u akkoord gaat met de deelname aan het onderzoek, zult u gevraagd worden om deel te
nemen aan een interview. Dit zal plaats vinden op een locatie van uw keuze. Het interview zal
ongeveer een uur duren.

III.

Risico’s:

Tijdens dit onderzoek loopt u niet meer risico dan in een normale dag van uw leven.

IV.

Voordelen:

Deelname aan het onderzoek levert niet direct voordelen voor u op. Maar uw deelname kan in de
toekomst anderen helpen als gevolg van verkregen kennis over de impact van sociale netwerken
op het overleven van partijen.

V.

Vrijwillige deelname en opzegging:

Deelname aan het onderzoek is vrijwillig. U hoeft niet aan het onderzoek deel te nemen. Als u
besluit om aan het onderzoek deel te nemen en van gedachten verandert, dan kunt u op elk
gewenst moment besluiten om te stoppen. U kunt vragen overslaan of de deelname op elk
gewenst moment stoppen. U zult geen voordelen verliezen waarop u anders recht had gehad, wat
u ook besluit.

VI.

Vertrouwelijkheid:

Wij zullen uw gegevens privé houden, voor zover dit door de wet wordt toegestaan. Dr. Jelena
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Subotic en Shannon Jones zullen toegang hebben tot de informatie die u verstrekt. Informatie
kan ook gedeeld worden met degenen die ervoor zorgen dat het onderzoek juist wordt uitgevoerd
(Georgia State University Institutional Review Board, de “Office for Human Research
Protection”, Verenigde Staten). De door u verstrekte informatie zal worden opgeslagen in
afgesloten kasten en veilige computerbestanden. Geschreven verslagen zullen binnen vijf jaar
nadat de gegevens zijn verzameld, worden vernietigd.
VII.

Contactpersonen:

Neem contact op met Dr. Jelena Subotic op 404-413-6173 of jsubotic@gsu.edu of met Shannon
Jones op 770-634-3156 of sjones104@student.gsu.edu als u vragen, bezwaren of klachten heeft
over dit onderzoek. Bel met Susan Vogtner in de Georgia State University Office of Research
Integrity op 404-413-3513 of svogtner1@gsu.edu als u met iemand wilt spreken die geen deel van
het onderzoeksteam uitmaakt. U kunt spreken over vragen, bezwaren, input geven, informatie
verkrijgen of suggesties geven over het onderzoek. U kunt ook bellen met Susan Vogtner als u
vragen of bezwaren heeft over uw rechten in dit onderzoek.

VIII. Mondelinge instemming
Als u besluit om deel te nemen aan dit onderzoek, zeg dan “Ja”.

Appendix E: Interview Protocol

My name is Shannon Jones and I am a PhD candidate in the Political Science Department at Georgia
State University in Atlanta, Georgia. I am researching the social networks of nationalist
organizations in Belgium. The purpose of this interview is to understand how relationships between
these organizations impact their longevity. Your participation will require approximately an hour of
your time.

This interview will take place with your informed consent. You have the right to confidentiality.
Your name and any other identifying characteristics will be withheld when I write up the results of
this study.

1. How long have you been a member of this organization? What motivated you to join?
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2. What is the purpose of your organization? How was it developed and by whom? Has the purpose
of the organization changed over time?
3. How does your organization attract new members? Does your organization use the internet for
communication and recruitment?
4. What are some of the strengths your organization?
5. Do you think your organization has been successful? If so, to what do you attribute your
organization’s success?
6. What are some of the weaknesses of your organization?
7. Are there factions and divisions within your movement? If so, why?
8. What other organizations are you active in?
9. Have the thwarted terrorist attack in Belgium and the Paris terrorist attacks of 2015 had an impact
on you or your organization?
10. Have these attacks strengthened or weakened the Flemish nationalist movement as a whole?
11. What do you feel is the most effective way to counter Islamic radicalization and terrorism?
Which organizations do you feel are the most effective at countering Islamic radicalization?

Appendix F: Centrality and Sustainability of Far-Right Parties
Country

Party

Centrality Vote Duration Threshold Modality

Austria

Freedom Party

50 17.54

56

4

20

Belgium

Vlaams Belang

185 7.76

8

5

7

Belgium

Belgian National Front

44 1.97

27

5

0

Belgium

New Flemish Alliance (N-VA)

181 20.32

15

5

4

Bosnia

Serbian Democratic Party

Bulgaria

Ataka

Cyprus

19

9.7

2

3

7

101

9.4

7

4

2

Greek Popular Front

0 1.08

4

1.8

0

Denmark

Danish People's Party

50 12.3

17

2

5

Estonia

Estonian Independence Party

13

5

0

0

0.2
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Finland

True Finns

277 19.04

17

0

14

France

National Front

374 13.6

40

37.5

4

France

Mouvement National Republicain

115 2.25

17

37.5

0

Greece

Golden Dawn

75

6.9

19

3

2

Hungary

Jobbik

47 16.7

9

2.83

1

Italy

Northern League

50

8.3

21

1.72

6

Italy

National Alliance

49 12.3

14

1.72

4

Latvia

National Alliance

22 13.9

2

5

2

Lithuania

Young Lithuania

0

3

5

0

Netherlands

Freedom Party

50 10.1

6

0

3

Norway

Progress Party

49 22.9

39

4

6

Norway

Norwegian People's Party

1

0.1

13

4

0

Poland

League of Polish Families

55

1.3

11

4

1

Portugal

National Renovator

120 0.31

12

0

0

Serbia

Serbian Radical Party

100

4.6

21

5

7

Slovak Republic Slovak National Party

74

4.6

23

5

5

Slovenia

Slovenian National Party

70

1.8

21

4

Spain

Platform for Catalonia

137 0.29

10

9.7

0

Sweden

Sweden Democrats

50 28.92

24

4

1

Switzerland

Swiss People's Party

50

1.9

41

8.6

10

Ukraine

All Ukranaian Union

70 10.4

21

5

4

UK

British National Party

59

1.9

30

37.5

1

UK

National Front

50

0

45

37.5

0

UK

UK Independence Party

50 12.6

25

37.5

1

4

Source: The VOSON Analysis System was used to identify the indegree centrality of each party
within its broader network. Electoral thresholds and electoral results are from the Global
Elections Database.

